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SOVEREIGNTY, FEDERALISM AND
PROPERTY IN THE BALANCE:
A PARADOX IN THE MAKING
Michael Peter Hatzimichalis*
Is not this disgraceful? Is this state to be brought to the
bar of justice like a delinquent individual? Is the sover-
eignty of the state to be arraigned like a culprit, or private
offender? Will the states undergo this mortification?'
INTRODUCTION
Since 1991, the Supreme Court has been taking hearty sips
from the goblet of federalism. This judicial policy of vigorously
policing federalist infractions is to be applauded. This Note
contends that the Court presently and historically has taken an
active role in defining the proper relationship between the federal
government and the states. The major areas of constitutional law
are replete with federalist overtones. The melody of federalism,
which the Court has sung continuously from as far back as the
formulation of the Erie doctrine,2 continues to reverberate in
present day Equal Protection Clause,3 Due Process Clause,4 Tenth
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2001; M.A., Brooklyn College, 1998; B.A.,
Brooklyn College, 1996.
'3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrTUTION 526-27 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1937) (quoting
speech of George Mason) [hereinafter 3 Elliot's Debates].
2 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See also infra Part L.A
(discussing Erie doctrine).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also infra Part I.B (discussing Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also infra Part I.B (discussing Due
Process Clause jurisprudence).
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Amendment 5 and Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 6 The Eleventh
Amendment also plays a unique role in the federalism brew.7
Our national government is a government of enumerated and
defined powers. In reality, however, it is no longer a national
government of limited authority. The cantankerous debates
surrounding the power and scope of central authorities did not
begin with the creation of our social compact, but have raged from
as far back as the ancients and are likely to continue indefinitely.
8
The peaks and valleys of the exercise and definition of federal
power have been influenced by countless exogenous variables: from
changes to our social fabric, norms, mores, and economic plight to
vogue academic and constitutional methodologies. 9 Irrespective of
5 U.S. CONST. amend. X. See also infra Part I.C (discussing recent Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also infra Part I.D (discussing Commerce
Clause jurisprudence).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial
Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id. The
Eleventh Amendment is one of only two clauses in the United States Constitution
that is instructive as how to construe the remaining constitutional text. The other
provision is the Ninth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Ninth
Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Id.
8 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (noting
that "the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted [to the
national government], is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise,
as long as our system shall exist"); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
149 (1992) (proclaiming 173 years later that "discerning the proper division of
authority between the Federal Government and the States" is "perhaps our oldest
question of constitutional law").
9 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (stating that "the
principle benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of government
power"); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985)
(adopting national political process approach to deciding issues of federalism);
National League. of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976) (articulating
affmnative limits on congressional power with respect to state sovereignty);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (declaring that local activities are
subject to congressional reach if they exert "a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce").
FEDERALISM
these seemingly anomalous shifts of power, one can discern a clear
pattern beginning to reveal itself. Currently there is fomenting a
slow but active movement towards loosening the grip of the federal
jaw by actively protecting states from the federal bite. These shifts
represent the never-ending debate of federalism-"the assignment
of dual responsibilities for governing to lower and higher levels of
government"°--and are reflected in all major areas of constitu-
tional law."
The Court's three most recent Eleventh Amendment decisions
have had the effect of expanding the states' sovereign immunity,
thus insulating them from federal overreaching.1 2 While the Court
historically has followed a pattern of vigorous federalism, it has
recently also has undertaken a unique role in protecting property
rights from over-burdensome governmental action. 3 As a result
of expanding the Eleventh Amendment, however, the Court has
paradoxically made property rights somewhat more difficult to
enforce. 4 Moreover, the Court has adopted an unduly restrictive
definition of property both unnecessary to its holding in College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
10 Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfield, Making Sense of the Antitrust
State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency
in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1203, 1204 (1997).
"1 These areas of constitutional law include the Erie doctrine, Due Process,
Equal Protection, Tenth Amendment, and Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See
infra Part I.A-D (discussing federalism in relation to these areas of constitutional
jurisprudence).
12 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) (hereinafter "College Savings F'); College Savings
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219
(1999) (hereinafter "College Savings I"); Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240
(1999). In all of the Court's most recent decisions the majority consisted of Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy and Justice
Thomas. The dissent consisted of Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer. The debate regarding federalism has fractured with
the fault line being philosophical grounds.
'3 See infra Part III.A (outlining recent Takings Clause jurisprudence).
14 See infra Part II.B (highlighting the tension between property rights and
federalism).
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Board ("College Savings IF,'),15 and inconsonant with modem
notions of property rights.
In its 1999 term, the Supreme Court has expressed that
federalism is a force with which to be reckoned. The Court, in
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank ("College Savings ,,),16 held that neither
the Patent Clause 17 nor the Commerce Clause 8 of the Constitu-
tion grant Congress the proper avenue by which to abrogate the
states' sovereign immunity.' 9 The Court opined that the abroga-
tion of state sovereign immunity in the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act ("Act")2" was a nullity in
that it was not enacted in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's guarantee of due process.21 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
speaking for the Court, explained that "sovereign immunity does
not yield to Congress' Article I powers,"22 and reaffirmed that
only legislation properly passed pursuant to Congress' enforcement
powers by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment can abrogate the
states' sovereign immunity.23 After determining that Congress
failed to identify a pattern of state infringement, the Court declared
15 119 S. Ct. 2219.
16 119 S. Ct. 2199.
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "The Congress shall have Power... [T]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." Id. See also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). "Whoever invents or
discovers any new useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefore." Id.
18 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power... [T]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." Id.
19 College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. at 2205.
20 35 U.S.C. § 296 (1994). The Act declared that "[a]ny State... shall not
be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United
States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal
court by any person ... for infringement of a patent." Id. at § 296(a).
21 College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. at 2205.
22 Id.




that a state's patent infringement violates the Due Process Clause
only where the state does not provide an adequate remedy to
affected patent holders. 4 In an effort to save the statute, petition-
ers stressed the need for uniformity in the national patent sys-
tem.25 The Court responded by acknowledging the statute's
purpose, but pointed out that uniformity is a function of Congress'
Article I "patent-power calculus" and does not give Congress the
authority to enact this type of legislation. 6
In College Savings 11,27 the Court insisted that unfair competi-
tion2' and false advertising claims29 under the Trademark Reme-
dy Clarification Act ("TRCA") ° fall far short of validly abrogat-
ing a state's sovereign immunity.31 Petitioner claimed that its right
to be free from false advertising and to be secure in its business
interests were indeed property rights protected by the strictures of
the Fourteenth Amendment.3 2 Applying a distinctly ancient view
of property,33 the Court, without meaningful analysis, quickly
rejected these claims.34 Moreover, the Court indicated that while
a state voluntarily may waive its sovereign immunity, a construc-
tive waiver of that immunity is impossible. 35 The TRCA, the court
24 Id. at 2208.
25 Id. at 2209.
26 Id.
27 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
28 See infra note 306 (listing the elements of the tort of unfair competition).
29 See infra note 303 (listing the elements of the tort of false advertising).
30 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The TRCA creates a cause of
action against any "person" for intellectual property disputes. Id. § 1125(a)(1).
The term "person" was defined to include "any State, instrumentality of a State
or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official
capacity." Id. § 1125(a)(2).
31 College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2224-27.
32 Id. at 2224.
3 Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (Brennan, J.) ("Much
of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do not fall
within the traditional common-law concepts of property.").
34 College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2225.
31 Id. at 2228 (overruling R. B. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't,
377 U.S. 184 (1964)). In Parden, Alabama attempted to dismiss a suit against
its state run railway predicated upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act by
pleading sovereign immunity. Parden, 377 U.S. at 184-86. The Court held that
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explained, cannot be positioned as a thorn bush waiting eagerly to
pierce a state's immunity the moment it acts as a participant in
interstate commerce.36 Rather, a state can only waive its sovereign
immunity when it unambiguously declares itself amenable to
federal jurisdiction. 37 Thus, states are amenable to suit only when
they voluntarily cast aside their shields of immunity and acquiesce
to battling potential litigants.
Finally, in Alden v. Maine, the Court held that Congress cannot
subject an unconsenting state to a lawsuit in its own courts.38 The
Court reasoned that, the "sovereign immunity of the states neither
derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amend-
ment" and that the "structure" and "history" of the Constitution
precludes such suits. 39 Thus, Congress lacks power under Article
I when it attempts to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity and
subject it to suit in state courts as well. In deciding Alden, the
Court was forced to take an extra-constitutional excursion, as the
issue was one of first impression.' Because the Eleventh Amend-
ment is silent with respect to state courts, the Court marshalled
"evidence of the original understanding of the Constitution."4 1 The
"scope of the States' immunity from suit," the Court concluded, "is
not demarcated by the text of the Amendment alone but by
fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design."'42 The
structure of the constitution, therefore, limits congressional
authority.
"when a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and enters into
activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation
as fully as if it were a private person or corporation." Id. at 196 (citations
omitted). Therefore, a state may constructively waive its immunity by participat-
ing in commerce subject to congressional authority. Id. at 192. Justice Scalia
described Parden as an elliptical opinion standing at the nadir of our waiver
(and, for that matter, sovereign immunity) jurisprudence." College Savings II,
119 S. Ct. at 2226.
36 College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2228.
7 Id. at 2229.
3 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 2260.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 2254.
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The foregoing trilogy of decisions, all sharply decided by a
plurality margin of five to four, indicate that the current Court will
go to great lengths to protect states from federal overreaching in an
attempt to further a devolution of federal power. Each majority
opinion rests heavily upon the history of the Constitution, the
Eleventh Amendment, dicta of the Framers, and places itself in the
historical (and yet quite modem) series of cases seeking a judicial
vision of federalism. This trilogy, in combination with the Court's
penchant for respecting the boundaries of federal and state power
in several other areas of constitutional law, indicate that the current
Court's lodestar is federalism.
Part I of this Note provides a brief synopsis of several areas of
modem constitutional law and posits that federalism and state
sovereignty are the driving forces behind the Court's rationale. Part
II analyzes the Court's most recent decisions with respect to the
Eleventh Amendment. Part III contends that the Court's recent
treatment of property rights is at odds with its expansion of
sovereign immunity. Property rights created by Congress' Article
I grant of authority now possibly may be disregarded and rendered
subservient to the magisterial concept of state sovereignty. In fact,
this collision between property rights and states' rights caused the
Lochner era43 Court to create the fictional Ex Parte Young
exception' to state sovereignty and the Eleventh Amendment.
Part I also contends that interests, which by themselves are not
encompassed by the traditional common law definition of property,
41 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480 (3d ed. 1997).
Professor Chemerinsky documents that during the period of 1905-1937, the
period known as the "Lochner era," the Court put forth and rigidly adhered to
three principle tenets: First, the Court operated from the shibboleth "that freedom
of contract is a basic right protected as liberty and property rights under the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Second, "government could
interfere with freedom of contract only to serve a valid police purpose: that is to
protect the public safety, public health, or public morals." Id. Lastly, "it was the
judicial role to carefully scrutinize legislation interfering with freedom of contract
to make sure that it served a police purpose." Id.
44 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Ex Parte Young allows for injunctive relief in
federal court for the alleged violation of federal law by state officers, as that
officer is stripped of her state's sovereign immunity when acting unconstitution-
ally. Id. at 159-160, 168.
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but carry with them strong federal concerns, should fall within the
purview of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection. This concept
of property rights, this Note concludes, may serve to undo the
Court's property paradox and, thus, return the full bundle of rights
owed to American property holders.
I. THE GENESIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: FROM
MEAGER BEGINNINGS TO MONOLITH
The Erie doctrine was one of the many steps in the Supreme
Court's federalism dance.45 Erie requires federal courts to apply
state law when sitting in diversity jurisdiction.46 In Erie, the Court
recognized that any contrary holding would allow the judiciary to
exercise authority that Congress itself lacked.47 In its Due Process
and Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence the Court has retreated
from subjectively weighing the merits and demerits of state
regulation4  and, now, accords state legislatures unyielding
deference.4 9 The Tenth Amendment,5 ° moreover, has resurfaced
as a substantive limit upon congressional authority.5 Lastly, the
Court has begun to curtail Congress' plenary Commerce Clause
authority so as not to invade upon traditional state concerns. 2
45 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
46 Id. at 78.
47 Id. (declaring that, "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules
of common law applicable in a state. ... And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts").
48 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (espousing "right
of contract" philosophy).
4 See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (upholding state
price control scheme).
50 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
" See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185-88 (1992)
(invalidating an environmental statute forcing states to assume ownership of
waste as exceeding the scope of congressional authority).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (invalidating
a federal criminal statute on the grounds that Congress' authority must be
curtailed so as not to trample upon traditional state powers); Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 826-27 (4th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999)
(invalidating a civil rights statute creating a federal private cause of action for
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A. The Erie Doctrine
As the Supreme Court's most recent trilogy reveals, the scope
of judicial power is a vital aspect of federalism. In 1842, in Swift
v. Tyson, the Court applied a broad view of the federal judiciary's
power. 3 By insisting that universal common law-cognizable to
only federal judges-should be applied in diversity cases, rather
than the forum state's common law, the Court impinged upon state
sovereignty by completely displacing a state's entire body of
law.54 Under Swift, a federal court sitting in diversity was not
constrained to follow the forum state's common law as would a
similarly situated state court.55 The Swift Court "believed that the
federal judiciary should develop a comprehensive body of substan-
tive law to serve as a model for state courts, thereby stimulating
uniformity in the legal doctrines applied by state courts. '"56 The
Court's decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins57 overruled Swift.
In a sharp turn of events, Erie held that Article III of the Constitu-
tion does not provide federal courts with the authority to create
substantive law in diversity cases.58
Today, the Erie Doctrine requires a federal court sitting in
diversity to apply the forum state's decisional and statutory law. 59
Diversity jurisdiction, therefore, does not modify common law
privileges. Moreover, Erie gives the states a decided power
advantage. If, for example, in a later decision, the state courts were
to disagree with a federal court's earlier decision interpreting a
state law rendered in a diversity suit, future federal courts would
gender motivated violence on the grounds that it impermissible impedes upon
state prerogatives).
" 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
14 Id. at 18-19.
11 Id. at 18 ("But admitting the doctrine to be fully settled in New York, it
remains to be considered, whether it is obligatory upon this court.").
56 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.2, at 192 (2d ed.
1993).
17 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
'8 Id. at 78. "There is no federal general common law." Id.
59 Id.
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be bound by the state court's determination.6 The Erie Court did
not make reference to the specific constitutional authority upon
which it based its decision: that Article III precludes federal judges
from creating and applying federal common law. 61 The Erie Court
found that the Swift doctrine "invaded rights which in our opinion
are reserved by the Constitution to the several states. 62 Although
the language is oblique, the Court was guided by the Tenth
Amendment63 and federalism principles. 64 Furthermore, the Court
in Hanna v. Plummer, "reminded" itself that it was constitutionally
impermissible to "fashion rules which are not supported by a grant
of Federal authority contained in Article I or some other section of
the Constitution; in such areas state law must govern because there
can be no laws. 65
Seven years after Erie, the Court had occasion to strengthen its
respect for state sovereignty. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. New
York, 66 the Court adopted what has come to be known as "the
outcome-determinative test., 67 In Guaranty Trust, the Court
60 RICHARD A. PosNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS CHALLENGE AND REFORM
42 (2d ed. 1996).
61 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
62 Id. at 80.
63 U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment provides: 'The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
6' John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693,
700-06 (1974) (noting that the Constitution does not grant the courts authority
to fashion state substantive rules of law).
6' 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965). Article I provides: "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. See
also BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 85
(1994) (pointing out that "federal courts ordinarily have authority to adjudicate
a case only if expressly authorized by the Constitution or valid statute
implementing Article Ill of the Constitution").
66 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
67 FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 56, § 4.3, at 200. The outcome determinative
test, while recognizing that the federal and state "judicial systems are not
identic," declares that diversity litigation in a federal forum should be "tried [as
if it were] in a State court.... A policy so important to our federalism must be
kept free from entanglements with analytic or terminological niceties." Guaranty
716
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interpreted Erie so as to preclude a federal court from reaching a
"substantially different result" from that of a state court.68 In
Hanna, the Court adopted a federalist perspective of the Erie
doctrine as well. For example, Justice Harlan wrote that the best
method of concluding whether a federal or state rule applies
requires a steadfast adherence "to basic principles by inquiring if
the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary
decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional
system leaves to state regulation. If so, Erie and the Constitution
require that the state rule prevail, even in the face of a conflicting
federal rule."'69 Thus, while veiled as a procedural prohibition
against forum shopping, the Erie doctrine forces federal judges to
yield to a state's sovereign immunity.
70
B. Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
The Fourteenth Amendment has had the effect of drastically
reordering federal and state relations, especially in regard to the
Court's review of property regulation. Initially, the Court, using
Trust, 326 U.S. at 108-09 (emphasis added). The gravamen of the outcome
determinative test is as follows: a federal court is prevented "from reaching a
decision at variance with the result that would obtain in a state court in a
comparable case." FRlEDENTHAL, supra note 56, § 4.3, at 200. Therefore, state
law must govern the controversy if the application of federal law would yield an
inapposite outcome. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 56, § 4.3, at 200.
68 FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 56, §4.3, at 200 (quoting Guaranty Trust, 326
U.S. at 109).
69 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
70 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938). For example, the
Court explained:
[T]he constitution of the United States ... recognizes and preserves
the autonomy and independence of the states-independence in their
legislative and independence in their judicial departments. Supervision
over either the legislative or the judicial action of the states is in no
case permissible except as to matters by the constitution specifically
authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with
either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the
state and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.
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natural law concepts, 71 acted to protect property owners from
burdensome economic regulation.72 The antecedents of this
movement are found in Calder v. Bull, where the Court upheld a
law that set aside a probate court's denial of inheritance to a
beneficiary.7 3 In so holding, Justice Chase declared: "I cannot
subscribe to the omnipotence of a state legislature, or that it is
absolute and without control .... There are certain vital principles
in our free Republic governments, which will determine and
overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to
authorize manifest injustice by positive law."'74
The high-water mark in the Court's history of frustrating state
legislatures and natural law is the Court's decision in Lochner v.
New York.75 In Lochner, the Court struck down a New York law
regulating the number of hours a baker could work on the grounds
that it interfered with freedom of contract.76 The Court rejected
71 See EVA H. HANKS ET AL. ELEMENTS OF LAW 459-497 (1994) (providing
examples of both natural law and legal positivism).
The relationship between law and morality is one of the oldest issues
of jurisprudence and central to an understanding of the nature of the
judicial process ... Natural law theories share the fundamental
premise that law and morality are inextricably intertwined, with the
latter setting absolute limits on the former .... Natural law combines
nature and law. Neither of these constituent concepts has a unitary
meaning or even generally accepted usage. Attempts to provide a
univocal, exhaustive definition are doomed to failure.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Holmes was quite critical of
natural law. "The jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that
naive state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted ... as
something that must be accepted." Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2286 (1999)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 312
(1920)).
72 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 471-94 (outlining the Court's
historical approach to economic liberties).
7' 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387 (1798).
71 Id. at 387-88. Justice Iredell, in a concurring opinion, took issue with
Justice Chase and asserted that the Court cannot declare a state law void because
the Justices' subjective and standardless notions of natural law are to the
contrary. Id. at 399.
75 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
76 Id. at 53. The Court, per Justice Peckham, held that the enactment
718
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the argument that the law was an appropriate use of the state's
police power." Justice Peckham recognized that a state's police
power encompasses "the safety, health, morals, and general welfare
of the public., 78 However, Justice Peckham also indicated "that
there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power by the
State."79 The Lochner Court reasoned that a state, even with its
plenary police power, cannot "assume the position of a supervisor,
or pater familias, over every act of the individual."8 In other
words, the nexus between the law and the legislature's purported
purpose was "too shadowy and thin" and it, therefore, must be
rejected.8 ' The Lochner opinion is more important for what it did
not stand for, however. Lochner did not stand for the proposition
that all state imposed economic regulation is invalid, but that the
Court will decide whether the reason to regulate is good enough to
surmount judicial scrutiny.8 2
"necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the employer and
employees... [and that] ... [t]he general right to make a contract in relation
to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th
Amendment of the Federal Constitution." Id. (citation omitted).
77 Id. at 58.
78 Id. at 53. Justice Peckham's view of the police power seems to comport
with James Madison's: "The powers reserved to the several States will extend
to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 45 at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)).
" Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56.
80 Id. at 62. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1126 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining paterfamilias as "[t]he father of a family. In Roman law, the head or
master of a family").
81 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62.
82 See id. at 57-58. The Court indicated that
[a law] must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the
end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held
to be valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to
be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own
labor.
Id. The difficulty with Lochner is that not only does the Court itself determine
the correlation between mean and end, but also whether the end itself is
719
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The Fourteenth Amendment is no longer a significant limitation
on state substantive regulatory power. For example, in Nebbia v.
New York, the Court upheld a state price control scheme, thus
undermining Lochner's second-guessing of state legislatures.83 In
Ferguson v. Skrupa, the Court explained: "Under the system of
government created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not
courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation."' 4 In
Skrupa, the Court upheld a Kansas statute that criminalized debt
adjustment, that is, where a debtor consents to make certain time
payments and, for a fee, the payments are funneled to creditors.85
The Court then famously concluded by asserting that the Court will
"refuse to sit as a super legislature to weigh the wisdom of
legislation., 86 In fact, in United States v. Carolene Products
Company, the Court indicated that "the existence of facts support-
ing the legislative judgment is to be presumed ... [and] is not to
be pronounced unconstitutional unless" the judgment is based upon
appropriate. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONsTITUTIONAL
LAW 466 (13th ed. 1997). This judicial second-guessing of the sovereignty of
state legislatures is exactly what prompted Justice Holmes to declare that "a
Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire."
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
83 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934). In Nebbia, the New York legislature created
a control board for the purpose of fixing minimum and maximum price values
for milk. Id. at 515. Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, held that "a state is
free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose.
The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is
declared by the legislature, to override it." Id. at 537. For further examples of the
Court retreating from Lochner and adopting a policy of respecting state
legislative priorities see Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955),
upholding a state statute proscribing opticians from dispensing lenses without
first receiving a prescription from an opthamologist or optometrist, West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), upholding a state minimum wage law
for women and minors, and Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398 (1934), upholding a law delaying home foreclosure.
8 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).
85 Id. at 726-28.
86 Id. at 731 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
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some irrational basis.87 The Court's penchant for deference to
legislative judgments drove it to even uphold retroactive civil
legislation.88 Certainly, the Court's inquiries are far less searching
when it comes to assessing state social welfare and economic
regulation.
Modem Equal Protection Clause doctrine accords state
legislatures equal deference with respect to regulatory matters. In
deciding whether a governmental classification serves a sufficient
purpose, the "Court has never insisted that a legislative body
articulate its reasons for enacting a statute. 89 Justice Thomas,
writing for the Court in FC.C. v. Beach Communications, declared
that "equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices." 90 Justice
Thomas further insisted that "a statutory classification ... must be
upheld against... challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classifica-
tion."9' Moreover, the Court, in analyzing a classification, allows
87 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
s See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (adopting
rational basis analysis with respect to retroactive civil liability). The Court has
also intimated that it is hesitant to strike down legislation as violating the Due
Process Clause. For example, in Railway Express Agency v. New York, Justice
Jackson pointed out that a due process violation "leaves ungoverned and
ungovernable conduct which many people find objectionable." 336 U.S. 106, 112
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). A due process infraction displaces an entire
field of activity from all regulation. Rather, invalidating a regulation based upon
the Equal Protection Clause "does not disable any governmental body from
dealing with the subject at hand." Id. It only implies that the "regulation must
have a broader impact." Id.
89 United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
90 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
9' Id. See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In McGowan,
the Court declared:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests
on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's
objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their
constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result
in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if
any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
Id. at 425-26 (Warren, C.J.) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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a state legislature to proceed one step at a time. For example, in
Railway Express Agency v. New York, the Court upheld a city
ordinance that disallowed advertising on trucks.92 The ordinance,
however, did not apply if the advertisement was promoting the
truck owner's own business, but did apply to "general advertise-
ments."93 Petitioners pressed that the distinction was irrational.'
In response, the Court held that the ordinance did not violate the
Constitution by attempting to eliminate one problem at a time.95
These decisions clearly indicate that the sovereignty of the state
and representative democracy force the Court to accord due
deference to state legislatures. Indeed, absent caprice, the Court
grants enormous latitude to a state's internal matters. In so doing,
the Court carefully avoids frustrating state legislative agendas.
C. The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment, the most simply stated of the Bill of
Rights, 9' has been the linchpin of the Court's most recent stance
toward a judicial doctrine of federalism and social regulation. The
Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."97 The
Court, has recently re-established its position that the Tenth
Amendment serves as a guardian of state sovereignty.98 The
92 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
9 Id. at 109-10.
94 Id. at 110.
95 Id. The Court elaborated:
And the fact that New York City sees fit to eliminate from traffic this
kind of distraction but does not touch what may be even greater ones
in a different category, such as the vivid displays on Times Square, is
immaterial. It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the
same genus be eradicated or none at all.
Id. (citations omitted).
96 U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
97 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
98 The Court in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
held that congressional legislation is violative of the Tenth Amendment when
that legislation interferes with government functions traditionally undertaken by
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amendment, as presently interpreted, has the effect of creating two
impenetrable spheres of influence by allowing the federal and state
governments to govern coterminously in an effort to accomplish the
amendment's laudable aim-the preservation of the liberty of our
people.
The Tenth Amendment's resurgence began in Gregory v.
Ashcrof.99 In that case, the Court held that a federal law should
not be applied to vital state government activities absent a clear
statement from Congress. 1°° While the Court did not strike down
the law via the Tenth Amendment, it did rely upon its "consider-
ations as a rule of construction."1 1 Ashcroft was a harbinger of
state and local governments such as, the relationship between a state and its
employees. Id. at 845. Nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985), the Court expressly overruled
National League of Cities. The Court reasoned that the political process was the
appropriate avenue of relief from laws that unduly burden states and rejected a
Tenth Amendment challenge. Id. at 551. In Garcia, Justice Blackmun relied upon
an influential article authored by Professor Wechsler. See Herbert Wechsler, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 559 (1954)
(arguing "that the Court is on weakest ground when it opposes its interpretation
of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interest of the states"). Dissenting
in Garcia, Justice Powell pointed out that the majority effectively rendered the
Tenth Amendment "meaningless rhetoric." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). As a result of the Court's most recent decisions, however, this Note
asserts that Garcia has arguably been overruled or at the very least forgotten. Cf.
Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999). In Alden, the Court held
Congress' Article I authority does "not include the power to subject nonconsent-
ing States to private suits for damages in state courts," and, in the process, non-
suited a group of state employees. Id. This holding translates into the fact that
Congress is effectively precluded from regulating the relationship between a state
and its employees. This is essentially the same holding the Court rendered in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976). Thus, properly re-
conceptualized, Alden is simply National League of Cities in different clothes.
But see Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2292 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Garcia remains good
law, its reasoning has not been repudiated, and it has not been challenged here.").
99 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
'0o Id. at 461.
101 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 232. "Justice O'Connor... discussed
the importance of autonomous state governments as a check on possible federal
tyranny and stressed the significance of the Tenth Amendment as a constitutional
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things to come, indeed. The Court, only one year later in New York
v. United States, struck down a portion of the Low Level Radioac-
tive Waste Policy Amendments Act, 10 2 which forced states into
ownership, and assumption, of all liability for radioactive waste not
properly disposed. 3 In New York, Justice O'Connor made clear
that the Tenth Amendment acts as a limit upon the enumerated
Article I powers allocated to Congress and, held, therefore, that the
regulatory scheme impermissibly impinged upon state sovereign-
ty.104 Justice O'Connor asserted that from that point on, the
Court, and not Congress, will determine "the constitutional line
between federal and state power."' 5 Put differently, the statute
was tantamount to "outright coercion" that impermissibly trampled
upon state sovereignty. 1°6
protector of state sovereignty." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 232.
102 42 U.S.C. § 2021b (1994). The Act established three different "types of
incentives to encourage the States to .. .[provide] for the disposal of waste
generated within their borders." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 152
(1992). This consisted of: (1) monetary incentives; (2) access incentives; and (3)
a take title provision. Id. at 152-53. The take title provision provided that in the
event a state did not properly dispose of its waste, it "shall take title to the waste,
be obligated to take possession ... and shall be liable for all damages ...
incurred." Id. at 153-54.
1"3 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185-88 (1992).
'04 Id. at 188.
105 Id. at 155. It is worth noting that the Court in New York did not apply
Garcia, whose political process approach clearly would have lead to a different
approach. This, too, lends more credence to the fact that Garcia's status as good
law is now questionable. Dissenting in Garcia, Justice Powell, speaking
specifically to the political process thesis, emphatically declared: "One can hardly
imagine this Court saying that because Congress is composed of individuals,
individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are amply protected by the
political process. Yet the position adopted [by the majority] today is indistin-
guishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment also is an essential part of the Bill
of Rights." Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.8
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting).
106 New York, 505 U.S. at 166. One commentator has suggested that as a
result of New York, the Court has bestowed upon the states an entitlement
protected by a property right. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy
of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual
Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 822 (1998). This entitlement is
"protected by a property rule ... [that] gives state governments a right to enjoin
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The Court's next encounter with the Tenth Amendment was
Printz v. United States. 10 7 In Printz, the Court struck down
portions of the Brady Handgun Prevention Actd ' that forced
local authorities to conduct background checks on putative handgun
owners."0 In rebutting the government's historical argu-
ments,110 The Court insisted that "Congress could not impose
[responsibilities upon the States] without the consent of the
States.""' In conclusion, the Court noted:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program.
Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that
prohibition by conscripting the State's officers directly.
The Federal Government may neither issue directives
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States' officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program. "1
2
The Court in Reno v. Condon, its most recent federalism
pronouncement, applied the newly ordained Printz-New York
framework."1 3 In Condon, South Carolina challenged the Driver's
federal efforts to force state officials to implement national law." Id. As a result,
"a vigorous intergovernmental marketplace" develops and allows states to bargain
for governmental services much like private profit seeking actors. Id. at 819.
'o7 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
108 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994). The Brady Act forced state officials to monitor
and investigate proposed firearm transactions by initiating a background check
with respect to the prospective firearm owner. New York v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 902-03 (1992). If the conscripted state official were to find that
proposed purchaser ineligible, then she must provide written notice to the
firearms dealer of that determination and elucidate those reasons therein. Id. at
903. A violation of the Brady Act was punishable by imprisonment for up to one
year. See id. at 902-04 (describing the operation of the Brady Act).
109 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
10 See id. at 905-19 (examining and dismissing historical evidence as
inconclusive).
. Id. at 910-11 (citation omitted).
12 Id. at 935.
113 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
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Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"),1 14 which "regulate[d] the
disclosure of personal information contained in the records of state
motor vehicle departments. 115 South Carolina argued that the
federal law forced it to implement federal policy and hence
violated the Tenth Amendment.11 6 The Court rejected this chal-
lenge insisting that the DPPA did "not require the States in their
sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens."11 7 Rather, it
regulates states as the proprietors of articles of commerce and is
therefore in harmony with the Printz-New York framework.1
8
The Court, in its decisions in Ashcroft, Printz, New York, and
Condon made one thing patently clear: that it-and no other
coordinate branch of government-will be the final arbiter of
federalism and that the Court will take an active role in preserving
our system of dual sovereignty. 1 9
D. The Commerce Clause
Initially, the Commerce Clause was viewed as a prophylactic
device to prevent states from regulating any activity occurring, or
114 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997). The DPPA precludes
disclosure of personal information obtained in connection with state departments
of motor vehicles. Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 668-70 (2000) (outlining the
DPPA's multiple provisions).
.. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 668 (2000).
6 Id. at 671. "South Carolina emphasizes that the DPPA requires the State's
employees to learn and apply the [DPPA's] substantive restrictions... and notes
that these activities will consume the employees' time and thus the State's
resources. South Carolina also notes that the DPPA's penalty provisions hang
over the States as a potential punishment should the fail to comply with the
[DPPA]." Id. at 671-72.
117 Id. at 672.
118 Id.
"' Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 890 (4th Cir.) (en
banc) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring), cert. granted sub nom. United States v.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999). Chief Judge Wilkinson describes Printz and New
York as being part of the "century's third and final era of judicial activism." Id.
Chief Judge Wilkinson opines that "[t]he common thread of contemporary




having its effects felt, beyond their own borders. lz On the other
hand, the Court, post-1937, was much more anxious to uphold such
regulation.1 2' The scope of Congress' regulatory authority-again,
largely in response to marketplace conditions-rapidly began to
expand. 122 Until recently, the Commerce Clause was interpreted
so as never to challenge congressional authority. 12 3 The Court's
decision in United States v. Lopez represents a marked retreat from
this proposition.
124
The Court in Lopez held that Congress' power "to regulate
Commerce ... among the several states ' ' 22 reaches only to
120 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (interpret-
ing the Commerce Clause as precluding the federal government from regulating
corporations with interstate operations); Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry Co. v.
Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 575 (1886) (interpreting the Dormant Commerce Clause
so as to preclude a state from regulating prices beyond its own borders). The
Commerce Clause is an affirmative grant of power to the national government.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. As a result, the Constitution provides no guidance
as to the proper course of action when a state law that regulates commerce is
enacted and there is no federal law on point. JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 281 (5th ed. 1995). The Court has addressed
this situation by introducing the Dormant Commerce Clause concept. Id. The
Dormant Commerce Clause creates "self-executing limitations on the scope of
permissible state regulation. Without a dormant commerce clause, states would
be free to enact legislation favoring local commerce and discriminating against
out of state commerce." Id.
121 See, e.g., Wickard v. Fillbum, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (adopting the
substantial economic affects test to Commerce Clause litigation).
122 See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945)
(holding that the Dormant Commerce Clause allows the state to concomitantly
regulate activity within the sphere of federal authority); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125
(adopting the aggregate impact approach to Commerce Clause litigation); South
Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938) (holding
that the Commerce Clause does "not foreclose all state action affecting interstate
commerce").
123 See H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially
Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REv. 849, 849 n.3 (1999). "Lopez, decided
in 1995, marked the first time the Court had struck down a federal law as
beyond the commerce power since 1936." Id.
124 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
'25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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commercial activities. 26 These commercial activities, which may
be interpreted to include a wide variety of economic undertak-
ings, 127 cannot be set loose from the operative constitutional term
"commerce," which serves to anchor federal power in order to
cover only aspects of business and trade interstate in nature. 128
On this basis, the Court struck down a federal statute making it a
crime to posses a gun in a school zone. 29 Moreover, as the
concurrence noted, "over 40 States already have criminal laws
outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school
grounds."1 30 Based, in part, on a textualist approach"' to the
216 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553.
127 See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114 (holding that growing wheat for
personal consumption affects commerce).
128 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553. See also Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 671
(2000) (holding that drivers' personal information, once released into the stream
of commerce, may be subject to congressional regulation). Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, worded the opinion quite carefully in
an attempt to emphasize the commercial character of the information. For
example, the Chief Justice wrote: "Because drivers' information is, in this
context, an article of commerce, its sale or release into the interstate stream of
business is sufficient to support congressional regulation." Id. (emphasis added).
In holding that personal information was an article of commerce, Chief Justice
Rehnquist consistently employed qualifying language such as, "in this context"
or "in the context of this case." Id. In United States v. Jones, the Seventh Circuit
upheld against a Commerce Clause challenge, a federal arson statute as it applied
to residential dwelling. 178 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Jones v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 494 (1999) (mem.). "Although living in one's
own house is not commerce," Judge Easterbrook explained, "the residential
housing industry is interstate in character. Goods and materials for housing move
across state borders; gas electricity likewise; the financial and insurance markets
that provide loans and spread risks have national if not international scope; arson
can substantially affect all of these." Id. at 480.
129 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (Supp.
11 1996). The new language employed in the statute bears emphasis. The new
statute reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any individual to possess a
firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate commerce. . ." Id.
The current version of the statute has not been challenged.
130 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131 Textualism seeks to distinguish between the subjective intent behind the
use of certain words and their objective meaning. HANKS, supra note 71, at 258.
Textualism, therefore, "forbids reference to anything but... [the] text in any and
all cases." HANKS, supra note 71, at 258. As Justice Holmes put it, "we ask, not
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term "commerce,"' 132 the Lopez holding rang the dormant bell of
federalism in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.'33 Lopez repre-
sents a retreat to the simple principle first enunciated in Gibbons
v. Ogden: The Commerce power delegated to Congress "is the
power to regulate; that is, the power to describe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed."1" This power, however, is limited
by the very terms of the Commerce Clause itself and hence should
not be used to invade upon trditional state endeavors and state soveaeignty. 35
what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of a
normal speaker." HANKS, supra note 71, at 258 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 417-19
(1899), reprinted in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 204, 207 (1920)).
132 But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer
objected to this textualist approach by insisting that "commerce" was a vague
term and this would, therefore, allow Congress to "rationally conclude that
schools fall on the commercial side of the line." Id. Justice Breyer reached this
conclusion by tangentially reasoning that schools inculcate children with human
capital and thereby affect the productivity of the national work force and thus
affect commerce. Id.
133 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in
Lopez: "We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers" and "[t]he powers delegated by the ...
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite." Id. (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))
(internal quotation marks onitted). Likewise, Justice Kennedy asserted:
Were the Federal Government to take over regulation of entire areas
of traditional state concern... the boundaries between the spheres of
federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would
become illusory. The resultant inability to hold either branch of the
government answerable to the citizens is more dangerous even than
devolving too much authority to the remote central power.
Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
3 Id. at 194. Justice Marshall, writing with respect to the outer reach of the
Commerce Clause, indicated:
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce,
which is completely Internal, which is carried on between man and
man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which
does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be
inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
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Further evidence of the Court's more activist stance toward
federalism was its treatment of congressional findings in Lopez. In
striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act ("GFSZA"), 136 the
Court aff'mned the decision of the Fifth Circuit, which partially
based its holding on the fact that the regulated activity lacked a
commercial nexus.137 Significantly, the Fifth Circuit also noted
the lack of legislative findings.1 38 In an effort to correct its
oversight, Congress adopted findings addressing the Fifth Circuit's
Id.
Recently, the Fourth Circuit in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169
F.3d 820 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison,
120 S. Ct. 11 (1999), exhibited similar federalist concerns. The circuit court
struck down a portion of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981
(1994) ("VAWA"), that created a private cause of action for victims of violence
motivated by gender animus. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 826-27. Relying heavily on
Lopez, the court stated that VAWA "simply cannot be reconciled with the
principles of limited federal government upon which this Nation is founded." Id.
See also Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 167, 191 (1996) [hereinafter Constitutional Faith].
We do not have to sit pat with a constitutional faith that rests on an
incorrect vision of what government is and what it can do. It is better
to forge a renewed constitutional faith in the original designs that saw
limited government not as a partial response to the new challenges of
the economic order, but as the complete and adequate architecture for
its own time, and for generations to come.
Id. See also Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73
VA. L. REv. 1387, 1388 (1987) ("I think that the expansive construction of the
clause accepted by the New Deal Supreme Court is wrong, and clearly so, and
that a host of other interpretations are more consistent with both the text and
structure of our constitutional government."); Hon. Alex Kozinski, Introduction
to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARv. J.L. PuB. POL'Y 1, 5 (1995) (asking "why anyone
would make the mistake of calling it the Commerce Clause instead of the 'Hey
you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause').
136 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)
(Supp. II 1996). The pre-Lopez version of the statute was bereft of any reference
to interstate commerce. The statute before the Lopez Court read as follows: "It
shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place
the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." Id.




concern. 3 9 Irrespective of Congress' newly discovered findings,
the Court struck down the statute. While the Court did not rest its
decision on a lack of findings, it did, in a brief aside, comment on
their absence. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that:
Although as part of our independent evaluation of the
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of course
consider legislative findings, and indeed even congressional
committee findings.... But to the extent that congressio-
nal findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected
interstate commerce, even though no substantial effect was
visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here. 40
In interpreting the above passage of the Court's opinion, one
commentator surmises that "in a close case, findings could help"
federal legislation pass Commerce Clause scrutiny. 14 1 More
importantly, however, Lopez indicates that the Court will make an
"independent evaluation" and will not passively defer to the
legislature when matters of federalism present themselves.
42
9 Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive
Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 757, 758
(1996).
The question of congressional findings was a backdrop to the entire
[Fifth Circuit] litigation... The only additional legislative history that
dealt with the 1990 Act was the record of a House of Representatives
subcommittee hearing. The hearings in the House revealed that the
entire focus was upon youth violence and the problem of guns in
schools. No witness drew any connection between guns in schools and
commerce. To the contrary, Richard Cook, the witness for the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, expressed concern that "constitu-
tional authority to enact the legislation is not manifest on the face of
the bill." Representative Hughes pursued this point in questioning
Cook, having Cook concede that the 1990 Act would be "a major
departure from a traditional federalism concept which basically defers
to State and local units of government to enforce their laws."
Id. at 766 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
'40 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added).
141 Friedman, supra note 139, at 762.
142 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. Note that the Court in Reno v. Condon, 120 S.
Ct. 666, 668 (2000), accepted congressional findings that states reap large profits
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After Lopez, the Court is, once again, taking the lead in judicially
defining and preserving federalism as a task unto itself.
The foregoing cases and their underlying principles ostensibly
indicate an advantage to criminal defendants charged under laws
having a tenuous relation to commerce, and states facing an
overreaching Congress. However, the juxtaposition of this line of
cases represents much more than that. These cases have attempted
to define the proper role of federal power, consistent with the
history surrounding our social compact, and its relationship
between states and individuals. One may dismiss these cases as
mere pluralities or scattered anomalies, but their focal point is
beyond doubt. When one adds up the Erie Doctrine, with the Due
Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, Tenth Amendment, and
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the sum is a judiciary actively
pursuing federalism.143
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: OLD WINE IN A NEW BOTTLE
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
from the sale of personal information, but only relied on those findings in a
single buried passage of the opinion, and it was undisputed by the litigants. But
see College Savings!, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2206-09 (1999) (examining congressional
findings, with exacting analysis, by illuminating flaws in Senate and House
committee reports, statements of committee members, and the paucity of
evidence documenting constitutional infractions).
143 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). In Ashcroft, Justice
O'Connor enumerated the virtues of federalism as follows:
It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the
diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for
citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more
innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes govern-
ment more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile
citizenry ... the principle benefit of the federalist system is a check
on abuses of government power.
Id. at 458 (citations omitted).
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any Foreign State."" By its very terms, the Eleventh Amend-
ment creates a substantive limit on the jurisdiction of federal
courts. The Eleventh Amendment simultaneously carves out the
breadth of precious constitutional protections and delineates the
proper boundary between what is truly federal and what is truly
state. Far from being placed in a sea of tranquility, the Eleventh
Amendment is one of the most widely debated provisions of the
Constitution. The theories espoused by both the Court and the legal
academy run the intellectual gamut. In order to truly grasp the
gravity of the Eleventh Amendment, an examination of the
competing theories is required.
In attempting to describe the voluminous case law interpreting
the Eleventh Amendment, Professor Jeffries writes:
As everyone knows, the Eleventh Amendment is a mess.
It is the home of self-contradiction, transparent fiction, and
arbitrary stops in reasoning. Any hope of doctrinal stability
is undermined by shifting paradigms, as the Eleventh
Amendment is inconsistently conceptualized as a form of
sovereign immunity, as an exception to federal jurisdiction,
and as a structural constraint on the powers of the national
government. 1
45
The Court, however, has been relatively consistent in its
application of Eleventh Amendment doctrine. 46 Instead, it is a
series of commentators, lumping criticism upon novel theory, that
have created the morass of which Professor Jeffries speaks.
Currently there exist five relevant and differing viewpoints of the
Eleventh Amendment. These viewpoints consist of (1) the Eleventh
Amendment operating as a restriction on subject matter jurisdic-
tion; 4 7 (2) the Eleventh Amendment operating as a restriction
'44 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
"4 John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section
1983, 84 VA. L. REv. 47, 47 (1998) (footnotes omitted). Professor Jeffries is the
Emerson Spies Professor of Law at the University of Virginia Law School.
See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2253 (1999) ('The Court has been
consistent in interpreting the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment."); Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 n.7 (1996) (listing case law spanning
103 years consistently affirming and applying Eleventh Amendment doctrine).
147 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) ("It is also
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upon diversity jurisdiction only; 48 (3) a textualist approach to the
Eleventh Amendment; 49 (4) an Article I congressional abrogation
theory; 50 and (5) state sovereign immunity created by the Tenth
Amendment, rather than stemming from the Eleventh Amend-
ment.15'
The Supreme Court's current view regards the Eleventh
Amendment as a circumscription of federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion.'52 As a result, the Eleventh Amendment shields state gov-
significant that in determining whether Congress has abrogated the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the courts themselves must decide whether their
own jurisdiction has been expanded."); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) (indicating that "the fundamental principle
of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. I11").
' Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Eleventh Amendment "bars only federal court suits against
States by citizens of other States").
149 Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment,
102 HARv. L. REv. 1342, 1371 (1989) (declaring that there is "no justification
for discarding the plain meaning of the text"). Professor Marshall is a professor
of law at Case Western Reserve University Law School.
"o Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation,
and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism,
89 HARV. L. REv. 682, 693 (1976) (stating that the Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence fails "to distinguish rights conferred against the federal judiciary
from rights conferred against Congress"); John E. Nowak, The Scope of
Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and
the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REv.
1413, 1415 (1975) (stating that the Court's Eleventh Amendment excursions fail
to address whether "Congress has the power to create a federal cause of action
against state governments"). Professor Tribe is the Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor
of Constitutional Law at Harvard Law School. Professor Nowak is the David C.
Baum Professor of Law at the University of Illinois School of Law.
' Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 61, 66 (1989) (stating that when sovereign
immunity "is viewed as a Tenth Amendment guarantee... the problems posed
by the current debate are resolved"). Professor Massey is an associate Professor
of Law at the University of California, Hastings College of Law.
152 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984).
Note that this view is not without its doctrinal difficulties. As a general rule,
subject matter jurisdiction may not be achieved by virtue of consent. Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975). But, the Court has also held that a state may
consent to suit irrespective of its sovereign immunity. Hans v. Louisiana, 134
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ernments from almost all suits. 5 3 This view is countenanced by
the fact that Article III of the Constitution, which delineates the
scope of the judicial power, begins by proclaiming that "[t]he
judicial power of the United States shall extend to .. . .""' By
contrast, the Eleventh Amendment begins by proclaiming that
"[t]he Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to . . . . A second theory, championed by the Court's
dissenters, also seeks recognition. This viewpoint claims that the
Eleventh Amendment restricts federal subject matter jurisdiction,
granted by section two of Article III, by disallowing suits against
states in diversity only.1 56 According to this theory, the Eleventh
Amendment does not preclude suits against states brought pursuant
to the remaining sections of Article III, mainly federal question
jurisdiction.157
To be sure, commentators have not been silent on the issue.
Professor Marshall would have the Court explore a textualist
approach to the Eleventh Amendment.' 58 Professor Marshall is
U.S. 1 (1890).
153 See infra Part II.A-B (outlining the Court's current view).
154 U.S. CONST. art. IH, § 1 (emphasis added).
155 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added). See also supra note 7 (noting
that the Eleventh Amendment is one of only two provisions in the Constitution
that provides instructions regarding constitutional construction).
156 See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 259 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the Amendment's narrow and technical
language [could not possibly] be understood to have instituted a sweeping new
limitation on federal judicial power").
157 Id. Note that this view is completely inconsistent with the Court's ruling
in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). See also infra Part II.A (outlining the
history of the Eleventh Amendment). The majority of commentators have
embraced this view as well. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1473-84 (1987) (arguing that the Eleventh
Amendment restricts a federal court's diversity jurisdiction only); William A.
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1060 (1983) (arguing that the
Eleventh Amendment's failure to mention in-state citizens suggests that only
diversity jurisdiction is barred).
' Marshall, supra note 149, at 1345 (opining that "it is ... difficult to
think of any other facet of the Constitution with respect to which the Court has
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critical of the Court for engaging "primarily in an originalist
inquiry, relying on evidence and speculation about the original
intent and purposes" of the amendment.1 59 Professor Marshall
places heavy emphasis on the words "any suit" contained in the
Eleventh Amendment. 6° As a result, even diverse citizens would
be precluded from bringing suit under federal question jurisdic-
tion. 6' Non-diverse citizens, Professor Marshall believes, are not
precluded from bringing any type of action against a state. 162
This latter assertion is somewhat similar to the diversity ap-
proach. '63
Professors Nowak and Tribe are proponents of a congressional
abrogation theory with respect to the Eleventh Amendment. 6
4
They argue that the Eleventh Amendment restricts federal courts
from hearing cases against states, but only when a federal statute
precludes such suits. 65 Congress, they suggest, can authorize
suits against states via the Supremacy Clause and by superseding
common law immunity.' 66 "Nothing in the language or history of
reached results so obviously inconsistent with the words used by the framers").
"' Marshall, supra note 149, at 1344. For example, Professor Marshall
chastises Justice Brennan for engaging in such an inquiry. Marshall, supra note
149, at 1334 n.10. Justice Brennan, according to Professor Marshall, pays
"uncharacteristic attention to the intent of the framers" by virtue of his personal
conviction that "state sovereign immunity is a pernicious doctrine, which is no
more than an anachronistic and unnecessary remnant of a feudal legal system."
Marshall, supra note 149, at 1344 n.10.
'60 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
161 Marshall, supra note 149, at 1346. Federal question jurisdiction is created
by Article III of the Constitution. Article III provides: "The judicial power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, Congress, with language tracking Article
III closely, has empowered federal courts to adjudicate federal question
controversies. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). Section 1331 provides: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id.
162 Marshall, supra note 149, at 1346.
163 Marshall, supra note 149, at 1346 n.14.
'64 Tribe, supra note 150, at 683; Nowak, supra note 150.
165 Tribe, supra note 150, at 694; Nowak, supra note 150, at 1445.
166 Tribe, supra note 150, at 693-99; Nowak, supra note 150, at 1445.
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the eleventh amendment," Professor Tribe asserts, "suggests that it
must be construed to limit congressional power under" Article I of
the Constitution. 167 In further support of his thesis, Professor
Tribe elliptically points out that the political process will serve to
protect states from unmitigated intrusion by Congress upon their
sovereignty. 168 The Court, however, has eschewed this posi-
tion.169 Professor Nowak similarly opines that the "pragmatic
problems of federalism posed by the eleventh amendment should
be resolved by Congress, not by the judiciary." 7 ° The enactment
of the Eleventh Amendment, Professor Nowak further suggests,
"does not necessarily connote a prohibition of congressional grants
of jurisdiction in private suits against states."' 7' Again, the Court
has explicitly rejected this position as well. 72 Moreover, it is
patently clear that ever since Marbury v. Madison, Congress cannot
167 Tribe, supra note 150, at 693.
.. Tribe, supra note 150, at 695. With respect to the Court's most recent
trilogy of cases, Professor Tribe believes that the rulings will probably have
"pernicious consequences for the enforcement of federal statutes across the
board." Marcia Coyle & Harvey Berkman, Justices Weigh in on Side of States:
Back to Antebellum Federal Relations, Say Some Critics, NAT'L L.J., July 5,
1999, at Al (quoting remarks of Professor Tribe). Professor Tribe has also called
the decisions "scary. They treat states' rights in a truly exaggerated way, harking
back to what the country looked like before the civil war and, in many ways,
even before the adoption of the constitution." THE ECONOMIST, The Supreme
Court: Activism in Different Robes, July 3, 1999, at 22 (quoting remarks of
Professor Tribe). To address Professor Tribe's criticism of the Court's recent
federalism decisions, when one seeks a judicial vision of federalism it is for the
purpose of securing the individual liberty of our citizens and not a harbinger of
slavery. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991) (pointing out that
"[iln the tension between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty")
(O'Connor, J.). There is nothing scary or pernicious about being of the opinion
that the Eleventh and Tenth Amendments operate as barriers to the exercise of
federal power and not as empty rhetoric and constitutional surplusage.
'69 See supra note 98 (discussing the Court's rejection of the political
process approach).
170 Nowak, supra note 150, at 1441.
17 1 Nowak, supra note 150, at 1431.
172 See infra Part II.B (analyzing Alden, College Savings I, and College
Savings I).
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expand the jurisdiction of federal courts beyond the boundaries
demarcated in the Constitution.'73
Professor Massey presents the final viewpoint of the Eleventh
Amendment's meaning. Professor Massey is partially in accord
with the Court's current views, but contends that state sovereign
immunity emanates from the Tenth Amendment rather than the
Eleventh. 7 4 Professor Massey accepts the text of the Eleventh
Amendment at "face value."' 75 Thus, it operates as a "jurisdic-
tional trumpcard," precluding jurisdiction based on all the provi-
sions contained in Article II.176 Reconceptualizing sovereign
immunity as a product of the Tenth Amendment, Professor Massey
argues, affords Congress an opportunity "to invade that immunity"
so long as it does not run afoul of the strictures of the Eleventh
Amendment.'77 As a result,
Congress could enable the federal courts to hear claims
against a state made by its own citizens asserting a
violation of a federal statutory or constitutional right.
Congress could not, however, enable the federal courts to
hear the identical claim presented against a state by a
citizen of another state. 78
The Court has explicitly rejected this view as well. 79
173 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 174 (1803). "[T]he power remains to the
legislature to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other cases than those
specified in the article which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the
judicial power of the United States." Id.
" Massey, supra note 151, at 66.
175 Massey, supra note 151, at 65.
176 Massey, supra note 151, at 65.
177 Massey, supra note 151, at 66.
... Massey, supra note 151, at 66.
171 See infra Part U.B (analyzing College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999);
College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240
(1999)).
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A. The Eleventh Amendment's Evolution
Article III of the Constitution delineates the scope of the
judicial power.80 For example, it allows federal courts to adjudi-
cate controversies "between a State and Citizens of another
State." 181 It also authorizes suits between "a State and Foreign
Citizens."18 2 While the ratification debates were raging, the
question of state sovereignty presented itself in connection with
Article 111.183 The central issue for determination was whether the
common law doctrine of state sovereign immunity would survive
given the language of Article III.1 This fiery debate was largely
fueled by the massive amount of debt the states had amassed as a
result of the Revolutionary War.185 The most prominent support-
ers of the Constitution vigorously attempted to assuage the states
of their concerns. Alexander Hamilton, for example, wrote in the
Federalist Papers:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amena-
ble to the suit of an individual without its consent. This
... general exemption ... [is] one of the attributes of
sovereignty ... now enjoyed by the government of every
'80 U.S. CONST. art. IlH, § 1. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." Id.
181 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
182 id.
183 Massey, supra note 151, at 97.
'a' See Nowak, supra note 150, at 1425-30 (discussing ratification contro-
versy). See also POSNER, supra note 60, at 42 (stating that "[tihe creation of the
lower federal courts was controversial, which is why Article Il merely
authorized Congress to create them").
185 See Nowak, supra note 150, at 1434 ("During the Revolution, the states
had incurred many debts and did not anticipate that they would be liable for
them in federal courts."). "Congress, understandably concerned that members'
home states might have to pay Revolutionary War debts they had largely ignored,
quickly passed the Eleventh Amendment, relegating creditors to the more hostile
arena of state courts." KuKLiN & STEMPEL, supra note 65, at 79.
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state in the union. Unless therefore, there is a surrender of
this immunity ... it will remain with the states.1 86
By the latter portion of this statement, Hamilton assured the
state conventions that a state would only appear in federal court as
a plaintiff, and would never be haled in as an unwilling defendant.
George Mason, the foremost opponent of the Article III language,
with unequaled rotundity declared: "It would be ludicrous to say
that you could put the state's body in jail. How is the judgment
then to be enforced? A power which cannot be executed ought not
to be granted." 187 Attending the same convention debate, James
Madison was forced to respond. Madison labeled Mason's fears as
"groundless" and then enthusiastically proclaimed that "[i]t is not
in the power of individuals to call any state into court."188 At this
point in our history, the matter appeared to be settled.
While the Constitution was ratified, the dispute over sovereign
immunity did not end with the Constitution's adoption. The Court
in Chisholm v. Georgia, held, despite the Founders' assurances
indicating otherwise, that the plain import of Article III did not
preclude a citizen of South Carolina from bringing suit against the
state of Georgia. 9 Georgia contended that Article III should be
construed so as to provide jurisdiction only when a state brings
suit, and not when a diverse citizen sues a state.19° Its argument
186 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548-49 (A. Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.
1961) (emphasis in original). See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 310 (J.
Madison) (declaring that "the States will retain under the proposed Constitution
a very extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not to be
wholly disregarded").
17 3 Elliot's Debates, supra note 1, at 527 (quoting remarks of George
Mason at the Virginia state constitutional convention).
1 3 Elliot's Debates, supra note 1, at 527 (quoting remarks of James
Madison at the Virginia state constitutional convention).
189 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See also Amar, supra note 157, at 1467
(describing Chisholm as "the first major constitutional case decided by the
Supreme Court").
'90 Amar, supra note 157, at 1468. Professor Amar adopts a unique
perspective of Chisholm. He contends that the threshold issue should have been
whether jurisdiction was proper. Assuming proper jurisdiction, the next inquiry
should be which law was to govern the controversy. Amar, supra note 157, at
1469. Under Georgia's common law at the time, a state could not be adjudged
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regarding Article III's symmetry fell upon deaf ears, save Justice
Iredell. 19' The Chisholm opinion was met with social opprobrium
and outrage. 192 In fact, so visceral was the response that Georgia
quickly responded to the decision by passing a law making it a
crime, punishable by death, to file suit against her.193 Approxi-
mately one month later, Congress overwhelmingly passed the
Eleventh Amendment in its present form. 94 One year after that,
it was ratified by the states. 195 The alacrity with which the
Eleventh Amendment was passed and ratified clearly indicates the
degree to which our founding generation placed faith in the
sovereign immunity of the states. 9
6
liable in assumpsit, irrespective of any sovereign immunity defense. Amar, supra
note 157, at 1469. Because petitioner did not bring suit pursuant to the Contracts
Clause of the Constitution, state law should have governed the controversy.
Amar, supra note 157, at 1470. In Chisholm, however, the Court disregarded
Georgia's common law and applied its own federal common law. Amar, supra
note 157, at 1470. In this respect, Professor Amar indicates, Chisholm is the
precursor to Swift v. Tyson. Amar, supra note 157, at 1470.
191 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 429 (opinion of Iredell, J.). Justice
Iredell, in an extended dissent, held "that no such action as this before the Court
can legally be maintained." Id. After analogizing the states to corporations,
Justice Iredell declared: "A State does not owe its origin to the Government of
the United States, in the highest or any of its branches. It was in existence before
it. It derives its authority from the same pure and sacred source as itself: The
voluntary and deliberate choice of the people.... A State is altogether exempt
from the jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States." Id. at 448 (emphasis in
original).
2 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1996) (deeming
Chisholm as "now-discredited"); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325
(1934) (indicating that Chisholm "created such a shock of surprise that the
Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed and adopted"); Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1890) (recounting the history surrounding the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment and discussing Justice Iredell's dissenting opinion in
Chisholm).
19' PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 810 (4th ed. 1998); Massey, supra note
151, at 111. See also Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1999) (recounting
the history surrounding the Eleventh Amendment).
194 ERwiN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 395 (3d ed. 1999).
195 Id.
196 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2261 ("The concerns voiced at the ratifying
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With Chisholm rendered obsolete, the seminal case with respect
to modem Eleventh Amendment doctrine is Hans v. Louisiana.197
Hans, a citizen of Louisiana, brought suit against Louisiana to
compel payment of the principal and interest due on state issued
bonds. 9 Hans invoked federal question jurisdiction, by bringing
his action pursuant to the Contracts Clause of the Constitution.199
While acknowledging that the plain import of the Eleventh
Amendment bars only diverse and foreign citizens from bringing
suit against a state, the Hans Court concluded that it would be
"anomalous" to force states into federal court when they are sued
by their own citizens.2° The Hans Court reasoned that cogni-
zance of this action, which is "unknown to the common law[,]...
was not contemplated by the constitution when establishing the
judicial power of the United States."2 °1 In an effort to maintain
jurisdiction, Hans appealed to the letter of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, emphasizing that it lacks any reference to non-diverse
citizens.20 2 This argument, the Court responded, was "an attempt
to strain the constitution and the law to a construction never
imagined or dreamed of."2 3 The Court concluded that the solu-
conventions, the furor raised by Chisholm, and the speed and unanimity with
which the Amendment was adopted, moreover, underscore the jealous care with
which the founding generation sought to preserve the sovereign immunity of the
States.").
197 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
198 Id. at 1.
'99 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. The Contracts Clause, in relevant part, provides:
"No State shall ... pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." Id.
200 Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
201 Id. at 15.
202 Id. at 9.
203 Id. The Court, relying heavily upon statements made by the founding
fathers and early Court decisions, opined:
It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations
that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other,
without its consent and permission; but it may, if it thinks proper,
waive this privilege, and permit itself to be made a defendant in a suit
by individuals, or by another state.




tion pressed by Hans would be "an absurdity on its face.
Therefore, for the last 110 years, states have enjoyed sovereign
immunity from suit in federal court brought by either diverse, non-
diverse or foreign citizens, irrespective of the subject matter of the
205cause of action.
Four years ago, the Court had occasion to revisit Hans in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.2°6 In Seminole Tribe, a
plurality held that the Eleventh Amendment estops Congress from
authorizing suits to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause.2 7 Congress may abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment, the Court explained, only when it is acting pursuant
to the powers conferred to it by Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.20 s Therefore, Congress cannot abrogate a state's
204 Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
205 See, e.g., Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 286 (1973) (opining that "we are reluctant
to believe that Congress in pursuit of a harmonious federalism desired to treat
the States so harshly"). See also In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921)
indicating:
[t]hat a state may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule
of jurisprudence having so important a bearing upon the construction
of the Constitution of the United States that it has become established
by repeated decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a
suit brought by private parties against a state without consent given.
Id. This immunity has over the years been extended to include the following:
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (holding that the
immunity of state officials shields them from suit to quiet title); Blatchford v.
Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991) (holding that sovereign immunity
bars suit by Native American tribes); Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors,
Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982) (extending sovereign immunity to include admiralty
suits); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (holding that sovereign
immunity denies jurisdiction to foreign nations).
206 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
207 Id. at 72-73. The Indian Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall
have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
208 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. Sections one and five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in relevant part, provide: "Section 1... No State shall.., deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. "Section 5... The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
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immunity pursuant to any of its other enumerated powers. Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is qualitatively different from any
other constitutional power, the Court explained, because it was
specifically intended to be a limit upon state sovereignty.2°9 The
Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, curtails the vigor of the Eleventh
Amendment. 21
0
Making matters more interesting, the Court, one year after its
decision in Seminole Tribe, drastically limited Congress' power to
enact legislation pursuant to Section 5 in City of Boerne v.
Flores.211 The Court, in striking down the Religious Freedom
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 5. In its holding, the Court overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1, 23 (1989). See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. The Court in Union Gas
previously held that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant
to its Interstate Commerce Clause power. Implicit in Union Gas was the notion
that Congress must force states into compliance with federal law and that the
Court should not play a role in protecting states from congressional overreaching.
Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the "plurality's rationale [in Union Gas]
... deviated sharply from our established federalism jurisprudence and essen-
tially eviscerated our decision in Hans." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64. He then
went on to declare "that none of the policies underlying stare decisis require our
continuing adherence of its holding." Id. at 66.
209 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. Chief Justice Rehnquist made it clear that
"[t]he Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article I1, and
Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon
federal jurisdiction." Id. at 72-73. See also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
455 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.) ("There can be no doubt that this line of cases has
sanctioned intrusions by Congress, acting under the Civil War Amendments, into
the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved
to the States.").
20 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. A collateral issue that now plagues the
lower courts as a result of Seminole Tribe is to determine whether a congres-
sional statute is passed pursuant to § 5 or any other power enumerated in Article
I of the Constitution. See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 139 F.3d 504 (5th
Cir. 1998) (holding that a copyright statute was not passed pursuant to § 5),
vacated and remanded, 180 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 1999); Crawford v. Indiana Dep't
of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Americans With
Disabilities Act was enacted pursuant to § 5); Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of
Commerce, 104 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Equal Pay Act was
enacted pursuant to § 5).
211 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Restoration Act ("RFRA"),2 12 asserted that Congress went well
beyond its Section 5 authority.2 3 The Court made clear that
Congress acts unconstitutionally when it attempts to create new
rights or attempts to expand upon the scope of substantive rights
that have not been recognized by the Court.214 Most recently in
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the Court, in a straightforward
application of City of Boerne, held that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA") 215 was unsupported by Congress'
Section 5 power.216 Justice O'Connor's ringing pronouncement
could not have been clearer: "Today we adhere to our holding in
Seminole Tribe: Congress' powers under Article I of the Constitu-
tion do not include the power to subject States to suit at the hands
212 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993) (repealed 1994). "RFRA prohibits government
from substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability unless the government can demon-
strate the burden (1) is in the furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest." City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1997) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
213 City of Boeme, 521 U.S. at 527. "Any suggestion that Congress has a
substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not
supported by our case law." Id.
214 Id. at 519. In this regard, Justice Kennedy explained:
The design of the [Fourteenth] Amendment and the text of § 5 are
inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree
the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States.
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause
cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce
a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given
the power "to enforce," not the power to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation.
Id. As a result of City of Boerne, any law enacted pursuant to § 5 can be
challenged as in excess of Congress' legislative authority. Id.
215 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994). The ADEA precludes both states and private
employers from refusing "to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual ... of such individual's age." Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 636 (2000) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(1)).
216 Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 650. "[W]e have also recognized that the same
language that serves as the basis for the affirmative grant of congressional power
also serves to limit that power." Id. at 644.
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of private individuals. 2 7 Additionally, the ADEA was not
promulgated pursuant to a proper exercise of Congress' Section 5
powers.21 8 Justice O'Connor buttressed her conclusions by ad-
dressing three salient facts. First, under Equal Protection Clause
analysis, age classifications are only subject to rational basis
scrutiny.219 Second, age characteristics are not conducive to
classification as "discrete and insular" minorities. 220 Lastly, the
ADEA provides for a heightened level of scrutiny in contradistinc-
tion to the Court's rational basis scrutiny.221 This change in
scrutiny, similar to the substantive change of the RFRA in City of
Boerne, does not constitute enforcement and was therefore
invalid.222 As was the case in the Tenth Amendment and Com-
merce Clause cases,223 the Court once again informed Congress
that it will be the final arbiter of federalism issues.
B. Enter The Trilogy
A majority of the justices of the Supreme Court certainly have
proven themselves to be "keepers of the Federalist flame. 224 Yet,
while the Court's recent federalism trilogy25 has successfully
fought to protect the rights of the states, this victory may have
come at the expense of individual enforcement of property rights.
217 Id. at 643-44.
218 Id. at 645.
219 Id. at 646. "Under the rational basis test, a law will be upheld if it is
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose." CHEMERINSKY, supra note
43, at 415.
220 Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 645. Here, Justice O'Connor was referring to the fact
that a statute may loose its presumption of constitutionality if it has the effect of
retarding the political process; hindering the right to vote; is directed at a
particular religious practice; targets racial minorities; or focuses on "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities." United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
221 Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 648.
222 Id.
223 Id. See also supra Part I.A-D (discussing federalism with respect to major
areas of constitutional law).
224 Amar, supra note 157, at 1429.
225 College Savings I, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); College Savings II, 119 S. Ct.
2219 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
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In Alden v. Maine the Court prevented a group of state employees
from bringing suit against the state of Maine in its own courts.226
These employees, thus, were precluded from recovering overdue
wages, and vindicating a property right.227 College Savings I and
College Savings II, moreover, confirm that the Eleventh Amend-
ment was drawn as a Maginot Line, slashing across all of the
jurisdictional heads of Article III. As a result, property rights
created by Congress' Article I authority cannot be vindicated in
court by those with such claims against a state. With respect to
property rights, the Court's trilogy may have the effect of dividing
the Constitution against itself.
1. Alden v. Maine
In Alden v. Maine the Court held that Congress may not subject
an unwilling state to a private suit in its own courts under the guise
of its Article I authority.22 In Alden, a group of probation work-
ers brought suit against the state of Maine, their employer, alleging
a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").229 Justice
Kennedy immediately declared that the "sovereign immunity of the
States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the
Eleventh Amendment., 230 Justice Kennedy reasoned that prior to
the adoption of the Constitution, the states enjoyed sovereign
immunity and that this doctrine was well established and stems
from English law. 23' This immunity was "universal in the States
226 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
227 Cf. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 339
(1969) (deeming the garnishment of wages "a taking of property").
228 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999).
229 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The FLSA, among other
things, regulates minimum wages and maximum work hours. Id. at §§ 206, 207.
Petitioners initially brought suit in federal court. Before the suit generated any
momentum, the Court decided Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996), whose holding patently barred such suits in federal court. After the case
was dismissed, petitioners filed the same action in state court in the state of
Maine. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
230 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
231 Id. at 2247.
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when the Constitution was drafted and ratified. '232 The history
and text of the Eleventh Amendment, Justice Kennedy claimed,
confirmed that its enactment served not as a redefinition of judicial
power, but rather as a restoration of the original constitutional
design.233 Thus, the amendment does not "enact language codify-
ing the traditional understanding of sovereign immunity" but rather
serves "to preserve the States' traditional immunity from private
suits.''234 Justice Kennedy boldly wrote that "[t]he Eleventh
Amendment confirmed rather than established sovereign immunity
as a constitutional principle; it follows that the scope of the States'
immunity from suit is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment
alone but by fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional
design.235 Therefore, "there was no need to draft with a broader
brush" as the less than elegant purpose of the amendment was to
overrule Chisholm.236
Justice Kennedy next focused on the issue of whether the
Eleventh Amendment's restriction on jurisdiction applies to state
23courts.  Justice Kennedy pushed aside the fact that the Eleventh
Amendment's terms only apply to federal courts.238 Relying on
Seminole Tribe and Hans, Justice Kennedy opined that a historical
pedigree approach was required, focusing on the structure of
sovereign immunity and constitutional design." Petitioners
insisted that both Article I, section eight, which enumerates
Congress' legislative power, and the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI240 provide Congress with the authority to override state
232 Id. at 2248 (citations omitted).
233 Id. at 2251.
234 Id. at 2251-52.
235 Id. at 2254 (emphasis added). See also Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (stating that "we have understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition..
which it confirms").
236 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2252.
237 Id. at 2254.
238 Id. at 2254-55.
239 id.
240 U.S. CONST. art. VI. The Supremacy Clause provides: "This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
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immunity.241 Justice Kennedy responded by indicating that resort
to these constitutional provisions "merely raises the question of
whether a law is a valid exercise of national power."242 "A
contrary view," Justice Kennedy elaborated, "could not be
reconciled with Hans v. Louisiana which sustained Louisiana's
immunity in a private suit arising under the Constitution it-
self. 2 3 Justice Kennedy then rejected the notion that legislation
enacted by Congress via its own inertia emanating from Article I
abrogates sovereign immunity.2 4 The combination of the Su-
premacy Clause and Congress' Article I powers, against which a
state's immunity stands as impregnable, Justice Kennedy conclud-
ed, "does not turn on the forum in which the suits were prosecut-
ed."
245
The Court then addressed petitioners' final averment-that
Congress, pursuant to Article I, may abrogate a state's immunity
in its own courts. 6 While this presented "a question of first
impression," the Court relied on history as its guide. 7 Petitioners
pressed that since the history of the Eleventh Amendment con-
cerned only suits in federal court, the historical record was devoid
of any instruction with respect to immunity in state court.248 The
Court disagreed stating that the "founders' silence is best explained
by the simple fact that no one, not even the Constitution's most
ardent opponents, suggested the document might strip the States of
... immunity" and, therefore, "the silence is most instructive."24 9
Justice Kennedy focused on the fact that even the discredited
Constitution or the Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
241 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2255.
242 Id. (citation omitted).
243 Id. Justice Kennedy also indicated that petitioners' assertion could not be
reconciled with Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare of Mo. v. Dep't
of Health & Welfare of Mo., 411 U.S. 279 (1973), which recognized that the Fair
Labor Standards Act does not abrogate a state's immunity although the state is
bound by the Act itself. Id.
244 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2255.
245 Id. at 2256.
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Chisholm majority conceded that sovereign immunity was impreg-
nable in the sovereign's own courts."0 The combination of the
"concerns voiced at the ratifying conventions, the furor raised by
Chisholm, and the speed and unanimity with which the Eleventh
Amendment was adopted, moreover, underscore the jealous care
with which the founding generation sought to preserve the
sovereign immunity of the States."'" Considering the foregoing,
Justice Kennedy opined that it would be "difficult to conceive that
the Constitution would have been adopted if it had been understood
to strip the States of immunity." 2
Justice Kennedy concluded his paean to federalism by consider-
ing why the power to subject unwilling states to suits in their own
courts is inconsistent "with the structure of the Constitution. 253
In so doing, Justice Kennedy set forth several powerful policy
justifications. First, such a power in the hands of a federal body
would insufficiently preserve the dignity of the states. 4 Such an
abusive power would force a state to "face the prospect of being
thrust, by judicial fiat and against its will, into the disfavored status
of a debtor, subject to the power of private citizens to levy on its
treasury or perhaps even government buildings or property which
the State administers on the public's behalf.' '255 Judgment credi-
tors could possibly put a state in ruinous financial condition,
resulting in a destruction of financial integrity as well as immunity
and political autonomy.2 6 Justice Kennedy reasoned that the
250 Id. Justice Kennedy stated:
When sovereigns are sued in their own Courts, such a method [a
petition of right] may have been established as the most respectful
form of demand; but we are not now in a State-Court; and if sover-
eignty be an exemption from suit in any other than the sovereign's
own Courts, it follows that when a State, by adopting the Constitution,
has agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of the United States,
she has, in that respect, given up her right of sovereignty.
Id. (quoting Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 452 (1793) (Blair, J.)).
25' Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2261.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 2263.





political process determines a state's allocation of its scarce
resources.257 Judgment creditors would have the effect of remov-
ing this allocation process from the public arena.25 8 Therefore,
asserting jurisdiction over states "would place an unwarranted
strain on the States's ability to govern in accordance with the will
of their citizens" and not by judicial decree. 59
The Court additionally reasoned that the power to force a state
into its own courts undermines one of the purposes of federal-
ism-the preservation of political accountability.2,° Assuming
that such jurisdiction existed, it would have the deleterious effect
of pitting "the State against itself and ultimately to commandeer the
entire political machinery of the State against its will and at the
behest of individuals. 261 State level policy decisions would not
only be partially transferred from the state government to the
federal government, but also concomitantly transferred to the states'
judicial department. 262 The judicial department, the Court rea-
soned, is institutionally incompetent to handle such a role.263
Finally, were the Congress able to abrogate a state's immunity in
its own courts, "the National Government would yield greater
power in the state courts than in its own judicial instrumentali-
ties. ' '2 4 To be sure, it would be anomalous and unwise to force
a state to respond to suit in state court and hold it immune in
federal court.
257 Id. at 2264-65.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 2265.
261 Id.
262 Id. Here, Justice Kennedy appears to be echoing the same concerns that
were voiced during the constitutional ratification controversy. See 3 Elliot's
Debates, supra note 1, at 527. "Thus, sir, it appears to me that the greater part
of these powers are unnecessary, and dangerous, as tending to impair, and
ultimately destroy, the state judiciaries, and, by the same principle, the legislation
of the state governments." 3 Elliot's Debates, supra note 1, at 527 (quoting
remarks of George Mason).
263 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2265.
264 id.
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2. College Savings I
In College Savings I, the Court struck down a federal statute
that purported to abrogate Florida's sovereign immunity pursuant
to Congress' Section 5 authority of the Fourteenth Amendment.265
The Court, pointing to its recent decision in City of Boerne v.
Flores,26 held that the statute did not operate to enforce the
strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore found it
lacking.267
College Savings Bank ("CSB"), for jurisdictional purposes, a
citizen of New Jersey, had obtained a patent based upon a unique
administration of a financing technique it had created with respect
to its educational finance activities.2 6 CSB launched a patent
infringement action pursuant to the recently enacted Patent Remedy
Act269 against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board, an arm of the State of Florida that administered a similar
financing program.270 The Patent Remedy Act clearly indicated
Congress' intent by unequivocally stating that its purpose was to
abrogate state sovereign immunity.271 Both CSB and the United
265 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
266 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
267 College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. at 2202, 2211.
268 Id. CSB issued certain commercial paper that incorporated a unique
method of financing designed to provide sufficient funds in order to cover the
costs of a future college education. Id. at 2202-03.
269 35 U.S.C. § 296 (1994). The Act declared that "[a]ny State... shall not
be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United
States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal
court by any person... for infringement of a patent." Id. § 296(a). The Act also
provides that "whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented
invention ... during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent." 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994). The statute then goes on to define the term "whoever"
as including "any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or
employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity."
Id. § 271(h).




States, as intervenor, attempted to defend the statute's constitution-
ality by contending that the abrogation of immunity was valid.
2 72
After dispensing with the uncontroverted fact that Congress had
properly expressed its intent to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity, the Court next addressed the issue of whether it was
within the purview of Congress' power to actually effect such an
abrogation.273 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, first
pointed out that Seminole Tribe274 illustrated that Congress cannot
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity pursuant to any of its Article
I powers.275 Therefore, by process of elimination, the only con-
gressional authority remaining was Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.276 Thus, CSB was forced to defend the statute by
painting it as a prophylactic measure designed to protect the
deprivation of property absent due process.277 Under City of
Boerne, however, "the legislation must nonetheless be 'appropriate'
under § 5 . "278 Therefore, as a threshold matter, if Congress
wishes to invoke its Section 5 authority, "it must identify [the]
conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or
preventing such conduct." 279 City of Boerne requires "a congru-
ence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end., 28 0
272 Id. at 2202.
273 Id. at 2205.
274 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
275 College Savings I, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1999).
276 ld.
277 Id. at 2204.
278 Id. at 2206.
279 Id. at 2207.
280 Id. at 2206 (quoting City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20
(1997)). See also Stephen Gardbaum, The Federalism Implications of Flores, 39
WM. & MARY L. REv. 665 (1998). Professor Gardbaum argues that the limits
placed upon Congress' enforcement power in City of Boerne "reset the federal-
state balance in the symbolically charged context of the Civil War Amendments."
Id. at 666. Most commentators contend that the Civil War Amendments
"reallocated powers from the states to the national government." Id. at 687.
Professor Gardbaum argues that this "reconstitutionalization of political power
from" state governments did not come to rest with the Congress. Id. at 688.
Rather, this power was "enshrined in the Constitution" and that "[tjhis is the
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The Court scoured the congressional record in order to identify
the evil Congress purportedly attempted to remedy.28 The evil,
it turns out, was the exact fact pattern exhibited by the current
litigation; that is, a state clothed with immunity, violating a patent,
but immune from litigation and damages.282 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, however, pointed out that "Congress identified no pattern of
patent infringement by the states, let alone a pattern of Constitu-
tional violations. 283 Thus, Congress described an evil that did
not exist.28
4
Chief Justice Rehnquist was forced to admit that patents are
clearly a form of property deserving of Constitutional protec-
tion.2" Neither CSB nor the United States, however, argued that
the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause 28 6 was a
possible source of congressional authority.287 Given that Congress
explicitly invoked its Article I and Section 5 authority, the Chief
Justice reasoned that as a result of this "omission," the Court was
without the benefit of any briefing and thus precluded from
considering the Just Compensation Clause argument.88 Instead,
the Court again reiterated the fact that "the legislative record...
provides little support for the proposition that Congress sought to
remedy a Fourteenth Amendment violation in enacting the Patent
Remedy Act.289
Relying on the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
pointed out two truisms: (1) the deprivation of a constitutionally-
most fundamental federalism issue raised in [City of Boerne]." Id.
281 College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. at 2206-09.
282 Id. at 2207.
283 Id.
284 Id. The Court pointed out that the House Report indicated that an
overwhelming number of states fully comply with patent law. Id. The Circuit
Court below illustrated that in the past 110 years (from the period spanning
1880-1990) only eight suits alleging patent infringement were brought against
states. Id.
285 Id. at 2208. See also infra note 371 (discussing patents as property
interests).
286 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
287 College Savings I, 119 S. Ct. at 2208.
288 Id. at 2208 n.7.
289 Id. at 2208.
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sanctioned property interest is not unconstitutional by itself; and (2)
that the sole mandate of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment is
that it requires due process be given.2' "Instead," the Court
elaborated, "only where the State provides no remedy, or only
inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement
of their patent could a deprivation of property without due process
result."29' In adopting the legislation, the Court insisted, Congress
gave scant consideration to the remedies made available by the
states.292 In fact, the Senate Report did not even mention the state
remedies available, while the House Report "made only a few
fleeting references. 293
Moreover, Congress failed to delineate what types of patent
infringement were to be actionable: whether negligent, intentional,
or reckless.294 Furthermore, Congress made no effort to limit the
scope of the statute so as to involve only constitutional violations
stemming from a lack of due process.295 With all of the foregoing
in mind, Congress' remedy to the imagined evil of states cloaking
themselves with immunity while depriving its citizens of property,
was, the Court concluded, incongruent and unproportional.296
3. College Savings II
In College Savings II, CSB brought another suit against Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educational Expense Board for allegedly
violating its patent and for making misrepresentations in its
literature with respect to its college tuition plans.297 The latter
charge was predicated upon the Trademark Act of 1946, commonly
290 Id.
29' Id. (citations omitted).
292 Id. at 2209. These state remedies included: a petition for a claims bill
demanding payment in full; a takings claim; or a conversion claim. Id. at 2209
n.9.
293 College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. at 2209.
294 Id.
293 Id. at 2210.
296 Id.
297 College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
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referred to as "the Lanham Act,' 298 which purported to authorize
suits against states by revoking their immunity.2 Here, the
Supreme Court was presented with, inter alia, the issue of whether
the foregoing averments constituted deprivations of property rights
secured by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. CSB
insisted that the Lanham Act was passed pursuant to Congress'
Section 5 enforcement powers by arguing that Congress was
attempting to "remedy and prevent state deprivations without due
process of two species of 'property rights': (1) a right to be free
from a business competitor's false advertising about its own
product, and (2) a more generalized right to be secure in one's
business interests." 3" Justice Scalia quickly concluded that the
foregoing do not constitute property rights deserving of due process
protection.0 1 He explained that "[t]he hallmark of a protected
property interest is the right to exclude others. ' 3° Justice Scalia
conceded that patents are traditional forms of property, but refused
to recognize the Lanham Act's false advertising sections, 303 as
they "bear no relationship to any right to exclude.,, 304 The mis-
representation provisions of the statute, Justice Scalia opined,
298 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The statute creates a cause
of action against any "person" for intellectual property disputes. Id. § 1 125(a)(1).
The term "person" was defined to include "any State, instrumentality of a State
or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official
capacity." Id. § 1125(a)(2). The Lanham Act also declares that "[a]ny State...
shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the
United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in
Federal court." 15 U.S.C. § 1122(b) (1994).
299 College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2223.
3oo Id. at 2224.
301 Id. at 2225.
'02 Id. at 2224.
303 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 130, at 1018 (5th ed. 1984). Dean Prosser describes the elements of the
tort of false advertising as follows: "The competitor who falsely advertised his
own goods, but who did not pass them off as those of the plaintiff, and who did
not disparage the plaintiff's goods, might be liable to a buyer who was deceived
by the false statements." Id.
304 College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2224-25. See also College Savings I,




invaded "no interest over which petitioner had exclusive domin-
ion., 30
5
CSB attempted to create a property interest by analogy to the
common law tort of unfair competition,3° which, it insisted,
protected property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.0 7 Using this analogy, it argued that, Congress was attempt-
ing to remedy property deprivations by enacting such legisla-
tion.308 Furthermore, CSB argued that an ongoing business
operation is a form of property per se.3°9 Justice Scalia rebutted
these contentions by asserting that "as a logical matter ... not
everything which protects property interests is designed to remedy
or prevent deprivations of those property interests., 310 Finally,
Justice Scalia insisted, that while business assets may be considered
property, ongoing business activity may not be: "the activity of
making a profit is not property in the ordinary sense-and it is
only that, and not any business asset, which is impinged upon by
a competitors' false advertising.' 3 1
With CSB's property claims rejected, the Court was not
compelled to consider whether the legislation at issue was enacted
3o5 College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2225.
306 See KEETON, supra note 303, § 130, at 1014-15. Dean Prosser enumerates
the elements of unfair competition as follows:
[U]nfair competition... can be found when the defendant engages in
any conduct that amounts to a recognized tort and when that tort
deprives the plaintiff of customers or other prospects ... [C]ertain
unfair competition torts appear to involve less a question of tortious
activity than a question of property to be protected.
Id.
31 College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2224.
0' Id. at 2225.
309 Id.
310 Id. Justice Scalia arrived at this conclusion by pointing out that the Due
Process Clause should not serve as a "font of tort law." Id. (quoting Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)). This assertion, in all likelihood, represents a
fear of possibly opening the gates to the federal courts, thereby flooding the
Court's docket and increasing administrative costs. This fear is a legitimate one.
As Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has documented,
283,688 cases were filed in the district courts and 49,625 cases were filed with
the courts of appeals in 1995 alone. POSNER, supra note 60, at 60.
3n College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2225.
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pursuant to Congress' authority under Section 5. The Court,
instead, examined the issue of whether a state can constructively
waive its sovereign immunity.312 A state can impliedly waive its
sovereign immunity, CSB argued, by allegedly engaging in activity
proscribed by a federal law.3 13 Justice Scalia, however, noted that
the Court's precedents reveal that a state can be stripped of its
immunity in only two ways: (1) by virtue of Congress properly
authorizing a suit pursuant to its Section 5 enforcement power; or
(2) by a state's voluntarily waiver of its sovereign immunity,
consenting to such suit.314 The Court, contrary to CSB's asser-
tion, held that a state does not constructively waive its sovereign
immunity by acting as a "market participant" and rejected any
analogy to its Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 1 5
Rather, the "test for determining whether a State has waived its
immunity from [urisdiction] is a stringent one., 316 As such, a
state's waiver of immunity must be unequivocal.317 Justice Scalia
indicated that constructive waiver is simply a stalking horse for
abrogation. 3" He remonstrated that the "statutory provision relied
312 Id. at 2226.
313 Id.
114 Id. at 2223.
315 Id. at 2228, 2230-31. See also supra note 120 (explaining the Dormant
Commerce Clause concept).
316 College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2226 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)).
317 Id. at 2226. In so holding, the Court overruled Parden v. Terminal
Railway of Alabama Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964), which held that a state
may constructively waive its immunity by participating in a market activity that
is federally regulated. College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2226-27. The decision
had been distinguished several times and overruled in part on one occasion. Id.
at 2226-31 (discussing treatment of Parden). Justice Scalia described it as ;'an
elliptical opinion that stands at the nadir of our waiver (and, for that matter,
sovereign immunity) jurisprudence." Id. at 2226. Justice Scalia based his
reasoning, in part, on Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974), wherein the Chief Justice declared that "[clonstructive
consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitution-
al rights." Id. at 673. Comparing sovereign immunity with the personal liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution provides us with a useful barometer of how far
the present Court will go in preserving federalism.
318 College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2230.
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upon to demonstrate that Florida constructively waived its sover-
eign immunity is the very same provision that purported to
abrogate it." '319 Justice Scalia's final contention in support of the
Court's holding was, indeed, both the simplest and the most lethal
to CSB. As CSB was a citizen of New Jersey, and the defendant,
an arm of the state of Florida, the present case fell precisely within
the purview of the text of the Eleventh Amendment. 320 Thus, the
Court had no jurisdiction whatsoever.
III. THE CONFLUENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL
FEDERALISM
The nexus of constitutionally guaranteed property rights and the
Court's protection of state sovereignty presents problems for the
former. The Fifth 321 and Fourteenth322 Amendments act as sub-
stantive restraints on the power of both the federal and state
governments, respectively: They prevent them from tampering with
property rights without affording due process. The Tenth 323 and
Eleventh324 Amendments, as well as the structure of the Constitu-
tion, limit the powers of the federal government with respect to the
states. The Court's recent federalism trilogy325 secured the correct
result from the perspective of federalism. In doing so, however, it
erred in its treatment of property rights. In College Savings II, the
Court rejected a property interest that it should have recognized,
threatening the security of constitutionally protected property
326interests. 6 Instead, by recognizing such interests under the law
that safeguards them, the Court can harmonize its federalism
jurisprudence with its vigorous protection of property rights.
319 Id.
320 Id. at 2232. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. "The Judicial power... shall
not.., extend to any suit... commenced... against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State." Id. (emphasis added).
321 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
322 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
323 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
324 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
325 See College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); College Savings II, 119
S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
326 College Savings I, 119 S. Ct. at 2225.
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A. The Supreme Court's Protection of Property Rights: The
Invigorated Takings Clause
The Supreme Court has historically and currently taken a firm
stance in vouchsafing property rights, thus insulating these interests
from overzealous regulators. Nowhere has this been more evident
than in cases concerning governmental takings of property. The
national government, as well as state governments, enjoy the power
of eminent domain, that is, the power to appropriate private
property in order to further governmental ends." 7 This power,
ultimately utilitarian in nature,328 is curtailed by virtue of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.329 The Fifth
Amendment, in relevant part, provides that "private property [shall
not] be taken for public use without just compensation. '' 330 The
importance of protecting property to the early Court is evidenced
by the fact that the Fifth Amendment was the first amendment
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.331
Early on, the Court eagerly protected property rights from
governmental incursion. For example, in Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon, the Court struck down a state law by insisting that its
327 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 523 (6th ed. 1990). "The power to take
private property for public use by the state, municipalities, and private persons
or corporations authorized to exercise functions of public character." Id.
32 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (explaining that
the Takings Clause precludes "the government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole").
329 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
330 Id. A government can appropriate private property via two principle
mechanisms: a possessory taking or a regulatory taking. CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 43, at 504-05. "A possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates
or physically occupies property. Alternately, a regulatory taking is when
government regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property."
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 55.
311 See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234
(1897) (stating that "a state may not, by any of its agencies, disregard the
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment").
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regulatory side effect traveled "too far., 3 3 2 The state statute had
the burdensome effect of not allowing a coal compact to employ
its mining rights, effectively resulting in forcing it to leave its
valuable coal reserves dormant.333 Justice Holmes, while candidly
recognizing that all government action thrusts costs upon the
polity,3 4 boldly held that "when [government action or regula-
tion] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there
must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
support the act.,
335
Beginning in the 1920s, the Court, however, set off on a course
of irrational reasoning that temporarily proved the Fifth Amend-
ment to be a dead letter. Indeed, absent resulting economic
impracticality,336 forcible invasion, 337 or transfer,338 the Court
perfunctorily upheld the "taking" of private property without
compensation.33 9
332 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
333 Id. at 412-13.
31 Id. at 413. Justice Holmes reasoned that a government would cease to
operate if it had to compensate for all of its externalities. Id.
335 Id.
336 See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591
(1944) (deeming rate of return resulting from government action unprofitable).
331 See Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,427
(1982) ("When faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical
occupation of real property, this Court has invariably found a taking."). For other
modem examples, see, e.g., Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 165 (1980) (holding that a taking occurs when the government confis-
cates interest payments); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180
(1979) (rendering the imposition of navigable servitude upon a private waterway
a taking).
338 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (announcing that
the statute at issue "purports to abolish what is recognized ... as an estate in
land-a very valuable estate-and what is declared by the Court below to be a
contract hitherto binding plaintiffs").
9 For examples of the Court's misconceived reasoning see generally
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1987), reje-
cting a Takings challenge to a statute forcing 50% of coal to lay dormant.
DeBenedictis is an interesting case because the Court was presented with the
same facts as in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon. The principle dispute between the
majority and dissent was that of proportionality-that is, whether the determina-
tion of a taking should be based on the relative or absolute value of property
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Recently, the Court has taken a much more receptive stance
toward the rights of aggrieved property holders. For instance, in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Court held that a
taking occurs when the government conditions a permit regarding
the development of private property on an owner's granting of a
public easement. 34° The Nolan's initially leased a parcel of
property with an option to buy and subsequently decided to
exercise that option.3 4 The exercise of the option was condi-
tioned by the state "on their promise to demolish [a rental unit
located on the property] and replace it."'342 As a result, a develop-
ment permit had to be obtained.343 The state commission, howev-
er, "recommended that the permit be granted subject to the
condition that they allow the public an easement to pass across a
portion of their property.",31 In deeming the state's action a
taking, the Court reasoned that a state's plenary police power
allows it to place a condition upon development, but only if it is
rationally related to eliminating any harm that would occur as a
result of the development itself.345 The Court insisted that "unless
the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the
development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation
of land use but an 'out-and-out plan of extortion.'"346
displaced. The majority stressed that only two percent of the coal would remain
idle. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 496 n.24. The dissent, meanwhile, emphasized
the fact that 27 million tons of coal were effectively appropriated. Id. at 518
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263
(1980) (rejecting a takings challenge to an ordinance that required the elimination
of multiple family dwellings); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that no taking exists when the government
designates private property as a landmark); Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding that a zoning ordinance resulting in a 75%
decrease in market value per acre was not a taking).
340 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987).
341 Id. at 827.
342 Id. at 828.
343 Id.
344 id.
345 Id. at 837.
146Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
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Expanding upon the principles set out in Nollan, the Court in
Dolan v. City of Tigard, required that there be a "rough proportion-
ality" between the burden created by the government's condition
and the government's justification for thrusting that condition upon
a rightful property holder in the first place."47 The requirements
of Nollan and Dolan effectively shift the burden of proof onto the
government-where it properly belongs-and requires it to
calculate its findings. Thus, by forcing the government to second-
guess itself, these holdings translate into a lessened willingness by
the Court to impede upon property rights, by making it much more
costly, or at the very least, prompting a more careful cost-benefit
analysis.
Furthermore, the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, found a taking when an environmental law prevented
construction of any structures on a recently purchased beachfront
plot.348 The Court also reinforced the principle that a deprivation
of economic viability constitutes a taking.349 Moreover, the Court
asserted that a taking might be a function of a property owner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations.35 ° In Lucas, the
plaintiff purchased two plots of land for approximately one million
dollars.5 Only after the parcel was purchased was the environ-
mental measure unexpectedly thrust upon him.352 Thus, a future
plaintiff may ostensibly present objective evidence with respect his
future economic plans, 35 3 and then shift the burden of going
forward to the government, which has the additional burdens set
forth in Nollan and Dolan. Finally, the Court also intimated that a
less than complete evisceration of economic viability might also
create the basis for a taking.354
m' 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
349 Id. at 1019.
350 Id. at 1031.
311 Id. at 1006.
352 Id. at 1008.
313 Id. For example, Lucas' intention was to "erect single family residences
.. [and] commissioned architectural drawings for this purpose." Id.
3' Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7
(1992). For instance, Justice Scalia added:
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B. Property Rights in the Face of Strident Federalism
The portion of the Court's opinion in College Savings 11
discarding CSB's property interest demonstrates its cognitive
dissonance with respect to the intersection of federalism and
property rights. While the Court's final judgment is satisfactory
from the perspective of federalism, it appears to make property
rights, something the Court has painstakingly sought to protect,
355
much more difficult to enforce. The Court's opinion in Alden v.
Maine, errs only insofar as its discussion pays no attention to the
textual provisions of the Constitution that protect property
rights.356 The Court's opinions in the College Savings cases set
odious precedents for the future recognition of property rights. In
College Savings 11, for example, the Court should have recognized
the property interests at stake, and then, at a minimum proceeded
to its due process or Section 5 analysis. By adopting a cramped and
ancient definition of property in College Savings 11357 with
respect to the fluid transactions that constitute business, the Court
appears to have adopted a policy at odds with itself, thus creating
a property paradox.
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all economically
feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not
make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss is to be
measured. When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to
leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we
would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been
deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of
the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution
in the value of the tract as a whole. Unsuprisingly, this uncertainty
regarding the composition of the denominator in our 'deprivation'
fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court.
Id. (citations omitted).
35 See supra Part LI.A (discussing Takings Clause jurisprudence).
356 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2251 (1999).




The Court first came to terms with this paradox in Ex Parte
Young.358 Ex Parte Young involved, inter alia, a substantive due
process property challenge stemming from a state's effort to
regulate railroad rates. 359 The Railroad company involved in the
litigation sought an injunction to prevent the regulation from taking
effect and a declaratory judgment deeming the law unconstitution-
al.36° The lower court granted the injunction361 and Edward T.
Young, the Attorney General of Minnesota, was held in contempt
due to his disregard of the court's order by persisting in prosecut-
ing the action.362 Mr. Young then petitioned for habeas corpus
relief relying on the Eleventh Amendment. 363 In Ex Parte Young,
the Court surprisingly held that a state officer is stripped of his
state's sovereign immunity when he acts unconstitutionally.3"
Justice Peckham explained that "[tihe sovereignty of the state is, in
reality, no more involved in one case than in the other. The state
cannot, in either case, impart to the official immunity from
responsibility the supreme authority of the United States. 365 In
effect, therefore, a state retains its full sovereign immunity, but a
state officer allegedly acting unconstitutionally cannot seek refuge
behind its veil. This has come to be known as the Ex Parte Young
fiction. 366 As a result, an action can be maintained effectively
318 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
319 Id. at 130. Interestingly enough, the Ex Parte Young opinion was
authored by Justice Peckham who also authored the Court's opinion in Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), only three years earlier.
360 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 144-45.
361 Id. at 133.
362 Id. at 134.
363 Id.
364 Id. at 159-60. "In the case of the interference with property, the person
enjoined is assuming to act in his capacity as an official of the state .... Such
official cannot so justify when acting under an unconstitutional enactment of the
legislature." Id. at 167.
365 Id. at 167 (citation omitted). This passage is the only instance where
Justice Peckham even uses the words "sovereignty" and "state" in the same
sentence; he mentions the Eleventh Amendment only twice in his opinion. Id. at
149, 155.
366 See Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 193, at 819 (describing Ex Parte Young
as resting "on a fictional tour de force"); Amar, supra note 157, at 1478-79
(describing the Ex Parte Young fiction as "doctrinal gymnastics").
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against a state in the name of the state actor who allegedly acted
unconstitutionally. 67 Justice Peckham, in the end, acknowledged
that this "distinction" would be "difficult to appreciate. 368 He
concluded, however, by asserting that "[t]here is nothing in the
case before us that ought properly to breed hostility to the
customary operation of Federal courts of justice in cases of this
character., 369 While Justice Peckham must have recognized the
conflict between the Eleventh Amendment and the property rights
at issue, he pretended as if it did not exist.370
The species of property at issue in the College Savings cases
creates a sharp federal interest, as intellectual property is distinctly
sought to be protected by the Constitution.371 Therefore, Justice
367 See Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the
Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495 (1997)
(explaining that "[u]nder Ex Parte Young, a suit to secure future compliance with
federal law, brought against a state officer, is not regarded as one against the
State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment") (footnote omitted).
'6' Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 168.
369 Id.
370 See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 890 (4th Cir.)
(en banc) (Wilkinson C.J., concurring), cert. granted sub nom. United States v.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999). For Chief Judge Wilkinson, what he describes
as judicial activism "falls in three general stages," the first epoch commencing
with Lochner and its prodigy. This era's hallmark, as championed by Justice
Peckham, was a "mobilization of personal judicial preference in opposition to
state and federal social welfare legislation." Id. In the midst of all this judicial
activism one can easily see how Justice Peckham in Ex Parte Young was driven
by the substantive due process aspect of the litigation. Creating the exception
allowed the railroads to bring suit and vindicate their property rights. See also
Jackson, supra note 367, at 511 (explaining that "[t]he harshness of the Hans
immunity has long been mitigated by the availability of injunctive relief against
state officers to prevent violations of federal law") (footnote omitted).
311 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id. See also 28
U.S.C. § 1368 (1994) (providing for original jurisdiction for intellectual property
disputes). It is well settled that patents are property interests. See, e.g.,
Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 399
(1906) (stating that "[a] trademark, or a tradename, or a title, is property"). Our
tax and bankruptcy laws treat patents as property as well. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.
§ 1235(a) (1994); 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (1994).
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Scalia's implicit concern in College Savings 11372 that the Consti-
tution is a charter of negative liberties, as opposed to an invitation
to the federal courts to bring the whole business of the states under
their wing, is misplaced. Justice Scalia, a professed originalist,3 3
has forgotten Madison's broad definition of the term "property."
Madison defined property as embracing "everything to which a
man may attach value and have a right., 374 While the term as
used in the Constitution is not given such a construction, m
Madison's idea of property should be given weight when, at a very
minimum, a federal interest is at stake.3 76 However, Madison's
definition, by its very terms, becomes operative only when a
deprivation of that property would provide the offended with a
legal "right." Marbury v. Madison teaches us that for every legal
right transgressed, the law supplies a remedy. 377 The fact that the
372 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
373 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 139 (1997). "What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what
I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original
draftsmen intended." Id. at 38. See also Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 862 (1989) ("originalism seems to me more
compatible with the nature and purpose of a Constitution in a democratic
system.").
3. Vail v. Board of Educ. of Paris Union Sch. Dist. No. 95, 706 F.2d 1435,
1450 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting) (quoting ESSAY ON PROPERTY, 6
MADISON, WRITINGS 101 (Hunt ed., 1906)).
... Vail, 706 F.2d at 1450.
376 The Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has also experienced the
intersection of property rights and strong federal interests. For example, in
Zacchini v. Scripp-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Court held that the First
Amendment does not "immunize the media [from damages liability] when they
broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent" thus infringing upon his
right of publicity, a proprietary interest. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). See also Harper
& Roe v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding magazine liable for
infringing property rights by publishing excerpts from a soon-to-be memoir of
President Ford). In the First Amendment arena the Court has also seen fit to
vigorously guard commercial speech as well. See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd.
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (emphasizing a
right to receive information with respect to commercial transactions).
37 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). "The very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is
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Constitution goes out of its way to safeguard property rights is
beyond dispute.378 The Court, although in another context, has
previously indicated that "[p]roperty interests . . . are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source as state law. 3 79 In a
forceful dissent, Judge Posner once wrote:
We infer the existence of a property right from the
remedies the law gives to protect it. A right protected by
an injunction, by specific performance, or by criminal
penalties is a property right. But if the only remedy the
law provides for some wrong is damages, we speak of a
liability rule rather than a property right.38°
Given Judge Posner's explication, the Court easily could have
found a viable property interest in the College Savings cases,
especially where the interference and false advertising claims were
coterminous with a trademark claim, specifically protected by the
Constitution and federal law.
3 1
The Lanham Act, at issue in College Savings II, specifically
provides for a nationwide injunction as one of the possible
remedies afforded to aggrieved parties.382 The right to an injunc-
to afford that protection." Id. See also Amar, supra note 157, at 1489 (opining
that Marbury dictates a narrow reading of sovereign immunity).
378 The Constitution specifically protects property rights. For example, the
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments all protect forms
of property rights. The Patents Clause, together with the Contracts Clause and
Bankruptcy jurisdiction of Article I, protect property rights as well. Justice
Holmes, furthermore, once admonished the Court to be weary of governmental
power over property. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922). He wrote: "When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be
qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend
the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears." Id.
3" Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
380 Vail, 706 F.2d at 1453 (citation omitted). In effect, Judge Posner is
indicating that while property is not created by the Constitution, it is created by
federal and state legislatures as well as the common law.
381 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
382 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Section 1125(c)(1), in
relevant part, provides: "The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject
to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable,
to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark
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tion-"[t]he traditional property law remedy"-may be regarded as
an assignment of a property right in and of itself 38 3 It constitutes
forward-looking relief in order to prevent future harm to a property
holder's interests. 3' 4 For example, an injunction granted by a
court disallows the enjoined from using the petitioner's property
absent some agreed upon resolution and compensation to the
property holder. 5 In such an instance, the injunction becomes a
property right, and one ordained by the full force of federal
law.386 Judge Posner has opined that "[o]nly interests substantial
or trade name .... ." Id. The Patent Remedy Act, at issue in College Savings I,
also provides for an injunction. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994). "The several courts
having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance
with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by
patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable." Id.
383 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICs 140-41 (2d
ed. 1997).
384 Id.
311 "If one views an injunction as always and forever prohibiting the
offensive activity, then its inflexibility is costly. However, if one views an
injunction as an instruction to the parties to resolve their dispute through
voluntary exchange, then it is an attractive remedy." Id. See also WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 29
(1987). "A property right is an exclusive right to the use, control, and enjoyment
of some resource ... irrespective of any argument that the general welfare,
whether defined in economic or any other terms, would be increased by
transferring the right to someone else." Id. See also Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) ("An entitlement is
protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove
the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction
in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.").
386 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 385, at 1092. When promulgating
the Lanham Act, Congress came to the realization that "[tihere is no essential
difference between trade-mark infringement and what is loosely called unfair
competition. Unfair competition is the genus of which trade-mark infringement
is one of the species ... All trade-mark cases and cases of unfair competition
involve the same legal wrong." Brief for Petitioner at 3, College Savings II, 119
S. Ct. 2219 (1999) (quoting S. REP. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275). There is no question that Congress can legislatively
create property interests. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. Viewed with the foregoing in
mind, the Lanhman Act should be read as codifying the common law torts of
unfair competition and false advertising. SK & F Co. v. Primo Pharm. Lab., 625
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enough to warrant the protection of federal law and federal courts
are Fourteenth Amendment property interests." '387 Given the
substantiality of the federal interest and the facts of College
Savings II, a property interest should have been found.388 To be
sure, we must be careful not to belittle the Constitution in such a
manner as to get federal courts involved in matters of common law
tort. But, the strong federal interest involved with respect to
trademark or patent claims is not to be denied, as they are
intertwined.389
The cramped definition of property adopted in College Savings
11 was completely unnecessary to its central holding. The lower
court in College Savings 11 was clearly devoid of jurisdiction by
virtue of the Court's previous holdings in Seminole Tribe390 and
City of Boerne,391 the lack of a due process infraction, and, more
importantly, the text of the Eleventh Amendment itself. 392 In fact,
as the Court determined in College Savings I, there had been no
F.2d 1055, 1066 (3d Cir. 1980). See also KEETON, supra note 303, § 130, at
1019 ("The language [of the Lanham Act] is so broad that it has brought within
its scope much of the law of unfair competition, so that the state law of that
subject is now substantially federalized.") (footnote omitted).
387 Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 1983).
388 Cf. Epstein, Constitutional Faith, supra note 135, at 191. Professor
Epstein explains that "the institutions of sound government do not rise and fall
with each advance in technology. Instead, they depend in large measure on the
creation and enforcement of a strong system of property rights; a judicious use
of regulation and condemnation for the provision of public goods; and an abiding
awareness that the dangers of self-interest lie as much in ourselves as governors
as it does in ourselves as the governed." Epstein, Constitutional Faith, supra note
135, at 191 (emphasis added).
389 See supra note 376 (discussing the First Amendment and federal
interests).
31 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
31 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
39 See College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2223 (1999). CSB was a citizen
of New Jersey attempting to sue the state of Florida. Id. The Eleventh
Amendment denies cognizance of "any suit" (this includes an action predicated
upon federal question jurisdiction as well) "against one of the United States" by
a diverse citizen. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added). The question of the




widespread deprivation of property which could have made Section
5 legislation appropriate.393 Therefore, while unfair competition
and false advertising are, according to the Court, not deserving of
property right status, CSB's underlying trademark and patent rights,
and the concomitant federal interest are sufficient to implicate
Fourteenth Amendment property interests.394 The question of
proper due process, jurisdiction, and the appropriate forum for
remedy are separate and distinct. A property right existed in
College Savings 11, and while the Court did not have to address its
existence in the first place, the Court refused to recognize it.395
'9' 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1999) ("Congress ... barely considered the
availability of state remedies for patent infringement and hence whether the
States' conduct might have amounted to a constitutional violation under the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
" Cf. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). The Court,
per Justice Stewart, declared that:
The dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false
one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to
enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to
speak or the right to travel, is in truth, a 'personal' right, whether the
'property' in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings
account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the
personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither
could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic
civil rights has long been recognized.
Id. (citations omitted). The Court on one occasion had admitted that it has had
some trouble defining what exactly constitutes a property interest. For example,
in Paul v. Davis, the Court explained: "It is apparent from our decisions that
there exists a variety of interests which are difficult of definition but are
nevertheless comprehended within the meaning of either 'liberty' or 'property'
as meant in the Due Process Clause." 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976). For a drastically
more fluid view of due process, see William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 492 (1977) (stating
that "[o]ur decisions enforcing the guarantee of due process clause have
elaborated the essence of that 'liberty' and 'property' in light of conditions
existing in contemporary society").
'9' As a result of the Court's opinions, Senator Leahy has tentatively
introduced legislation attempting to effect waivers of sovereign immunity with
the Court's current framework. Senator Leahy's Intellectual Property Protection
Restoration Act ("IPPRA") attempts to restore protections and safeguards to
those holders of intellectual property against unlawful infringement. The IPPRA
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The Court's trilogy may indeed be nectar for those only
concerned with preserving the structural components of the
Constitution. But one must be cognizant of the fact that, at a
certain juncture, this constant evasion of the federal yoke yields
diminishing returns. As this analysis has suggested, the Court's
decision in College Savings II is a perfect example of this ineffi-
cient departure. 396 With today's technology-driven economy,
property rights, especially intellectual property rights, need to be
safeguarded.397 Federalism, as historically advanced,39 s and as
advanced in Alden v. Maine399 and College Savings 1400 are the
proper results of a Court adhering to our social compact. When
property rights are at stake, however, the Court, at a minimum,
must not cavalierly disregard the recognition of a property interest
when trampling down the highway of federalism. The Court's
trilogy has showed us at least this much.
induces states to participate in a federal intellectual property system along with
private corporations. Entry into the IPPRA is conditional. That is, a state can
only partake of the benefits of the federal intellectual property system if they
unconditionally waive their sovereign immunity. If a state chooses not to enter
the federal intellectual property system, then remedies against the state for
alleged violations of intellectual property rights are allowed to the maximum
extent available under the strictures of the Constitution. Note that Senator Leahy
has not committed himself to the IPPRA but has circulated a tentative draft for
comment. Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 1999, S. 1835,
106th Cong. For examples of states waiving their immunity and consenting to
suit, see, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 98004 (West 1998) (partially waiving
sovereign immunity with respect to suits arising from a gaming compact); CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 6814 (West 1977) (waiving immunity with respect to actions
to quiet title); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-32A-1 (Michie 1987) (waiving
sovereign immunity with respect to insurance coverage); VT. STAT. ANN. PUBLIC
PROPERTY & SuPPLIES § 1403 (1989) (waiving sovereign immunity by municipal
corporations and counties).
396 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
'9' Cf. Brennan, supra note 394, at 503 ("Federalism need not be a mean
spirited doctrine that serves to limit the scope of human liberty.").
398 See supra Part I (discussing federalism with respect to major areas of
constitutional law).
'99 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).




The Supreme Court has historically acted in a manner with
federalism lurking in the background. As of late, the Court has
been at the vanguard of a movement to enforce a vision of
federalism in consonance with the Framers' writings, the text,
structure, original understanding, and history of the Constitution.
The Court concomitantly has undertaken a similar movement
toward protecting property rights and property holders from
overreaching and confiscatory government action. Both of these
movements are to be applauded. However, one must notice that
these two paths may, in certain situations, intersect. The point of
intersection produces a seemingly irreconcilable paradox. It yields
a locus of property rights in combat with states' rights.
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment is exquisitely simple:
"No State shall ... deprive any person of ... property, without
due process of law."4 1 One of the effects of the Court's trilogy,
College Savings II in particular, was to exclude property rights
created via Article I from the sweeping command of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 The Fourteenth Amendment is without qualifica-
tion; it safeguards all property. °3 In College Savings I, the Court
held that Article I cannot be used to pierce a state's sovereign
immunity.' This, at bottom, is a question of jurisdiction. In
College Savings II, the Court denied the existence of a property
interest in claims stemming from a law enacted under the aegis of
Article I." The Court did not have to reject these property
interests, as it was devoid of jurisdiction and no due process
infraction was found. As the Court put it in Alden v. Maine, the
Eleventh Amendment stands as a restoration of the original
constitutional design.4 6 Constitutional design is one thing, but the
40l U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
' College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2225.
403 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
' College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. at 2205.
405 College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2225.
" 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2251 (1999). But see College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. at
2219 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of relying on "constitutional
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actual text of the Constitution is quite another. The Constitution is
imbued with protections to safeguard property interests.4 7 While
the Court should strive to protect both property and state sovereign-
ty, it should act with even more vigor when state governments or
the federal government infringe upon property rights. The Court's
most recent trilogy errs in only this respect. This balance is in
congruence with both the Court's precedents and, more important-
ly, the text of the Constitution, and the Court should adopt it.
penumbras rather than constitutional text").
4 See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 544 (1972). The
Court, on one occasion, put it this way:
It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be
protected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property.
Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the
framers of that Amendment as an essential pre-condition to the
realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the Amend-
ment was intended to guarantee.
Id. (quoting Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948)).
